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to do. Conclusions are based on an independent proportionality review of Maryland 
death sentences in comparison with the findings of the court. 
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Chapter 1: Capital Punishment in the Early Period (1600’s – 
early 1930’s)  
Capital punishment was one of several English customs brought into this 
country with the establishment of the early American colonies. As the American 
colonies grew and separated from England and the church, the death penalty evolved 
too.  The range of crimes punishable by death changed.  Early executions were 
frequently carried out in the Northern colonies for religious offenses reflecting the 
initial influence of the church.  The number of crimes punishable by death decreased 
and evolved to reflect a more secular society. (Paternoster, 1991 p. 5)  Capital 
offenses were also reduced by categorizing crimes with different degrees of 
seriousness. (Paternoster, 1991 p.6)  Degrees of murder allowed juries to convict a 
defendant of murder without being compelled to inflict death sentences through 
mandatory death sentence statutes.  This was the beginning of a trend to move away 
from mandatory death sentence statues and toward discretionary ones.  
Despite the narrower definition of a capital crime and wider discretion among 
capital juries, the number of executions increased throughout the early period.  
Research done by Schneider and Smykla reports that there were 162 executions in the 
1600’s, climbing to nearly 1400 in the 1700’s, and over 5000 in the 1800’s.  The first 
three decades of the 1900’s saw roughly 1500 executions.  Schneider and Smykla also 
noted that the death penalty gradually shifted from executions performed under 
mostly local authority in the early 1600’s to executions performed under mostly state 
authority by the 1900’s. (Paternoster, 1991 p.4)   The populations being put to death 
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in the early period consisted of criminals who committed capital offenses as well as 
those who posed a threat to established authority.  This second group was often made 
up of people identified as witches or blasphemers or minority populations under pre-
Civil War Slave Codes and post-Civil War Black Codes.  These race-based statutes 
called for harsher sanctions for those crimes committed by black offenders.  
(Paternoster, 1991, p.8)    
Capital Punishment in the Pre-Modern Period (1930-1972) 
The capital punishment landscape started to change during the pre-modern 
period.  The steady increase in executions seen in the early period continued through 
the1930’s before waning over the next three decades.  By the 1960’s the United 
States execution rate had slowed to an average of 20 executions a year.  There were 
nearly 4,000 executions performed in the United States from 1930 – 1970.  The 
distribution of executions over this period was geographically uneven with 60% of 
these executions occurred in the South (Paternoster, 1991 p.14).  The unevenness of 
executions didn’t stop there.  The racial makeup of the death row inmates executed 
during this period was imbalanced.  Nearly half of all executions for murder and 90 
percent for rape were comprised of black offenders despite the fact the black 
population never topped 12% of America's overall population during that time period. 
(Gibson and Jung, 2002).  
Executions stopped in 1967, not to be resumed for nearly a decade.  
According to Paternoster (1991, p. 18) this 10 year gap in executions “was probably 
due to two related factors: (1) a de jure moratorium on capital punishment while the 
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United States Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of state death penalty 
statutes, and (2) declining public approval for the death penalty.”   
McGautha v. California 
In 1971 the Supreme Court decided McGautha v. California which addressed 
the constitutionality of standardless juries and single-jury verdicts.  The complaint in 
McGautha was that the jury used to determine guilt did so without instructions as to 
“which factors should be most determinative and the amount of weight given to them 
was left entirely in the hands of the jury.” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 46).  The McGautha 
court concluded that standardless juries and single-jury verdicts as they were used in 
1971 were constitutional, upholding the death penalty.   
Furman v. Georgia 
One year after McGautha, the Supreme Court heard Furman v. Georgia. The 
complaint in Furman was that “discretion provided to capital juries under existing 
[death penalty] statutes produced a pattern of death sentences that lacked logic or 
rationality,” (Paternoster 1991, pp. 67).  The complaint further argued that these 
illogical or irrational death sentences were “cruel and unusual”, in violation of the 8th 
Amendment.  In a surprising turn from the McGautha decision, the Furman court 
examined the same sentencing schemes scrutinized the previous year, and changed 
their minds declaring the death penalty unconstitutional.  The Furman decision is 
often viewed as the most famous death penalty case to date.  Aside from concluding 
that the death penalty was unconstitutional, Furman was unique in two other ways.  
This 5-4 opinion was over 200 pages in length—the longest decision handed down by 
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the Supreme Court at that point in history and that “all five justices in the majority 
and all four dissenters filed individual opinions.”  (Paternoster,1991 p.53)   
The majority of the justices agreed that the death penalty was unconstitutional, 
but disagreed on which parts were the problem.  Some of the justices found the 
unguided discretion provided to capital juries produced “a pattern of aberrant 
sentences” which violates the 8th Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. (Paternoster, 1991 p. 53).  Justice Douglas “concluded that there is an 
equal protection element in the Eighth Amendment that makes a punishment ‘cruel 
and unusual’ if it is not inflicted in an even-handed manner.” (Paternoster, 1991, p. 
53).  Justice Stewart noted that the “principle flaw of standardless juries is that they 
produce a pattern of capital sentencing that cannot be explained by any rational 
process.” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 55).  Justice Brennan explained that the death penalty 
is cruel and unusual “no matter what procedures or protections are in place” and is 
“an affront to basic human dignity” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 56).  Similar to Brennan, 
Justice Marshall agreed that the death penalty is “cruel and unusual” no matter how it 
is administered.  Marshall continued and said that the death penalty is “cruel and 
unusual” because it is “excessive or because contemporary society finds it offensive.” 
(Paternoster, 1991 p. 57).  Marshall addresses the public support found in opinion 
polls of the early 1970’s by contending that the value of these opinion polls are 
limited to the extent that the public holds an uninformed opinion on the death penalty.  
Justice Stewart declared that “death sentences are unusual in the same way that being 
struck by lightening is cruel and unusual.”  He further noted that: 
For, all the people convicted of rapes and murders in the 1967 and 
1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a 
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capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of 
death has in fact been imposed…the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under 
legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and 
freakishly imposed. 
Furman concluded that the death penalty as it was administered prior to 1972 was 
unconstitutional for a variety of reasons.  “Approximately 600 occupants of death 
rows across the United States in 1972 would not be executed.” (Paternoster, 1991 pp. 
58).  Although the varied opinions in Furman made it clear that death penalty statutes 
as they had been administered were unconstitutional, there could be little found in the 
decision regarding suggestions to modify death penalty statutes so that they could 
pass constitutional muster in the future.  In a rare effort to guide legislatures in the 
future, the Furman court cited the 1967 recommendations of a presidential 
commission in this area.  The commission’s report offered the following (Furman, on
or about p. 463): 
The question whether capital punishment is an appropriate sanction is 
a policy decision to be made by each State.  Where it is retained, the 
types of offenses for which it is available should be strictly limited, 
and the law should be enforced in an evenhanded and 
nondiscriminatory manner, with procedures for review of death 
sentences that are fair and expeditious.  When a State finds that it 
cannot administer the penalty in such a manner, or that the death 
penalty is being imposed but not carried into effect, the penalty should 
be abandoned. 
Chief Justice Burger provided a little more guidance on the matter in his dissent: 
“Either state legislatures attempted to eliminate the problem of jury discretion 
altogether by drafting mandatory death penalty statutes or they attempted to provide 
sentencing discretion through so-called guided discretion statutes.” (Paternoster, 1991 
p. 58).    
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Modern Period (1972 – present day)
The states’ response to Furman  
Several states immediately went to work revising their death penalty statutes 
in response to Furman. Within a few months new capital statutes were being pushed 
through the legislatures.  Florida was the first of thirty-five states to ratify new death 
penalty statutes over the four years following Furman. The revisions were based on 
very loose guidance found in Furman. Since the main issues in Furman were 
standardless and single-verdict juries violating the Eighth Amendment’s “cruel and 
unusual punishment” clause, most of these revisions focused on reducing or 
eliminating discretion in capital juries. These new statutes fell into two main 
categories: mandatory death penalty statutes and guided discretion statutes.   
Mandatory death penalty statutes eliminated the discretion in capital juries by 
defining specified crimes, such as murder in the first degree, as punishable by an 
automatic death sentence.  North Carolina, among other states, crafted a mandatory 
death penalty statute.  The North Carolina statute stated that: 
A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, 
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, 
deliberate and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the 
perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, 
kidnapping, burglary, or other felony, shall be deemed to be murder in 
the first degree and shall be punished with death.  All other kinds of 
murder shall be deemed murder in the second degree, and shall be 
punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two years nor 
more than life imprisonment in the State’s prison. [N.C. Gen. Statute 
Sec. 14-17 (Cum. Supp. 1975)]  
 -cited from Paternoster (1991) pp. 57-58 
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In the case of a mandatory death penalty statute, once a person was found 
guilty of first degree murder the job of the jury was complete because this person 
received a death sentence automatically.  Several other states chose to revise their 
death penalty statutes using non-mandatory means.  This other option evolved into a 
guided discretion statute.  The guided discretion statutes do not take the discretion 
entirely out of the capital jurors’ hands.  Instead they provide additional guidance for 
the capital jurors in three ways: bifurcated capital hearings—hearings at which the 
guilt phase is separate from the sentencing phase; sentencing guidance with lists of 
aggravating and mitigating factors; and an automatic appellate review process.  Most 
of the revised statutes consisted of a combination of these elements, if not all of them. 
Aggravating factors are specified in the state death penalty statute, often under 
the definition of first degree murder.  These aggravating factors often include the 
murder of a peace officer or the murder of a person in combination with another 
violent felony such as rape or murder.  They describe crimes that are much worse 
than a straight murder in a relative sense.  This list of aggravators is used by a capital 
jury when determining guilt.  In the case of Georgia’s revised statute, the capital jury 
must find at least one of the aggravating factors is present beyond a reasonable doubt 
before the jury may consider imposing a sentence of death (Paternoster, 1991 p. 60). 
In an automatic appellate review, a court with statewide jurisdiction reviews 
each death sentence on appeal to determine if it is “warranted by the facts and is not 
inconsistent with the penalty imposed in other cases.” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 62).  The 
automatic appellate reviews aim to measure whether a death sentence is “excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 
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and the defendant.” [Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 27-2537 (Supp. 1975)] from (Paternoster, 
1991 p. 63). 
Gregg v. Georgia 
Four years after Furman, thirty-five states had revised their death penalty 
statutes and the death row population was starting to grow.  In the summer of 1976 
the Supreme Court handed down five death penalty cases in Gregg v. Georgia and its 
companion cases (referred to Gregg from here on).  These cases tested the 
constitutionality of revised death penalty statutes from Georgia, Florida, Texas, North 
Carolina, and Louisiana.  The revised statutes for Georgia, Florida, and Texas were 
guided discretion statutes while North Carolina’s and Louisiana’s statutes were 
mandatory death penalty statutes.  The Court decided that the death penalty in general 
did not violate the Eighth Amendment.  Justice Stewart offered the strong legislative 
response to Furman as evidence that the public supported the death penalty.  Given 
that the death penalty was constitutional on a broad level, the Court then examined 
whether the revisions in the statutes corrected the problems brought up in Furman.
They decided that the guided discretion statutes from Georgia, Florida, and Texas 
were constitutionally admissible; however, in deciding that the mandatory death 
penalty statutes from North Carolina and Louisiana were unconstitutional, they struck 
them down. 
The justification for striking down the mandatory death penalty statutes rested 
in the logic that mandatory death penalty statutes simply moved the discretion—it did 
not address the problem.  Juries still had the ability to remove the sentence of death 
by refusing to convict those defendants they deemed not deserving of the death 
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penalty, and it removed the ability of the jury to “consider the unique characteristics 
of the defendant.” (Paternoster, 1991 p.65).   
Although the Gregg decision lacked a majority opinion, the Court clearly 
approved of several aspects of the guided discretion statute.  In finding the guided 
discretion statutes constitutional, Justice Stewart highlighted three desirable elements: 
bifurcated sentencing proceedings, statutory factors (aggravators and mitigators) to 
guide the jury in its decision making, and appellate review of all death sentences.  
The purpose of these new guidelines was to “ensure consistency and proportionality” 
(Paternoster, 1991 p. 65) among death sentences.  The Gregg Court further explained 
how the automatic appellate review process guards against problems highlighted in 
Furman:
[The Georgia statute] provides for automatic appeal of all death 
sentences to the State’s Supreme Court.  That court is required by 
statute to review each sentence of death and determine whether … the 
sentence is disproportionate compared to those sentences imposed in 
similar cases.   
Moreover, to guard further against a situation comparable to that 
presented in Furman, the Supreme Court of Georgia compares each 
death sentence with the sentences imposed on similar situated 
defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is 
not disproportionate.  On their face these procedures seem to satisfy 
the concerns of Furman. No longer should there be “no meaningful 
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.” 
 ---Gregg v. Georgia, p. 198 - 199 
The opinions in Gregg predicting the value of the constitutionally acceptable 
revisions were speculation because “the statutes under review were so recent that 
there was no real experience with the pattern of sentences produced by guided 
discretion schemes.” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 65).  While the court clearly approved of 
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certain aspects of the guided discretion statutes, the Court said nothing about what 
was constitutionally “required.” (Paternoster, 1991 p. 104).   
Gregg had changed the capital punishment landscape in two ways.  First, the 
death penalty was a constitutionally admissible punishment once again.  Secondly, 
although Gregg did not provide a list of constitutional requirements for death penalty 
statutes, the approval of the Georgia statute offered a model for other states to copy in 
order to ensure a constitutionally admissible death penalty statute in their state.  In 
response to Gregg, many states modified their death penalty statutes to reflect the 
changes noted in the constitutionally approved Georgia statute.   
Death row populations grew with application of the newly revised statutes.  
The first execution in nearly a decade occurred in 1977.  Over the next few years 
death rows grew and the number of execution went up.  The increase in death 
sentences was accompanied by additional questions regarding the constitutionality of 
various aspects of the death penalty.   
The Court addressed these issues in several cases over the next few decades, 
further defining the constitutional requirements of the death penalty.  In Lockett v. 
Ohio (1978), the Court affirmed the right of the defense to offer mitigating evidence 
to the sentencer to support a sentence less than death (Paternoster, 1991 p. 104).  
Booth v. Maryland disallowed the use of “victim impact statements” during the 
penalty phase of a capital trial. (Paternoster, 1991 p.84).  South Carolina v. Gathers 
held that “prosecutors’ comments concerning the personal characteristics of the 
victim were invalid sentencing considerations.”  (Paternoster, 1991 p. 84).  Zant v. 
Stephens held that the prosecution had the same right to offer aggravating evidence to 
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the sentencer as the defense does to offer mitigating evidence.  (Paternoster, 1991 p. 
78).   
Pulley v. Harris  
The Court addressed the constitutional necessity of proportionality reviews in 
Pulley v. Harris. The defendant in Pulley appealed his death sentence on the grounds 
that the California death penalty statute lacked a provision for proportionality review.  
The statute required an automatic appeal, but failed to require the California Supreme 
Court to compare respondent's sentence with sentences imposed in similar capital 
cases, and thereby to determine whether they were proportionate.  Justice White’s 
majority opinion in Pulley recognized that the Georgia and Florida statutes 
determined to be constitutionally admissible in Gregg included a proportionality 
review component.  However, Justice Stewart pointed out that the Texas death 
penalty statute was approved sans a proportionality review component in Jurek v. 
Texas (1976), one of the companion cases in the Gregg decision.  As long as a death 
penalty statute provides for a means to “narrow the range of cases eligible for the 
death penalty” (Paternoster, 1991 p.82), then a proportionality review is not 
constitutionally required.  Pulley (p. 44-54) held that:  
The Eighth Amendment does not require, as an invariable rule in every 
case, that a state appellate court, before it affirms a death sentence, 
compare the sentence in the case before it with the penalties imposed 
in similar cases if requested to do so by the prisoner. 
White also reiterates: “In the view of Jurek, we are quite sure that at that juncture the 
Court had not mandated comparative proportionality review whenever a death 
sentence was imposed,” and then cites a footnote in Justice Rehnquist’s dissent from 
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Woodson v. North Carolina: “If the States wish to undertake such an effort [i.e.,
proportionality review], they are undoubtedly free to do so, but surely it is not 
required by the United States Constitution.”   
 The Pulley court distinguished between a “traditional” proportionality review 
in which the court examines whether the sentence is disproportionate to the crime, 
and a comparative proportionality review in which the court compares the sentence 
imposed to sentences of others convicted of the same crime. (White, 1999).  Pulley 
maintained traditional proportionality review, albeit with a narrower application.  The 
comparative proportionality review was deemed unnecessary. (Bruce, 2002). 
 Since Pulley, some states have preserved the comparative proportionality 
review element in their death penalty statute while other states have not.  David 
Baldus and his colleagues noted a small trend after Pulley whereby a few states 
repealed the statutory requirement of comparative proportionality review (Baldus, 
1990 p. 280).   
McKleskey v. Kemp 
 Three years after the Court decided Pulley v. Harris, additional Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims were raised in McCleskey v. Kemp.  The defendant 
asserted that his death sentence was unconstitutional because it was disproportionate 
to his sentence and his sentence was influenced by race, an extralegal factor.  The 
defendant presented an empirical study conducted by David Baldus (1990) and his 
colleagues showing the imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended to some 
extent on the race of the victim and the accused.  This study was deemed “the most 
sophisticated and careful study of criminal sentencing yet conducted” (Paternoster, 
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1991 p.155) and concluded that, “even after taking account of numerous nonracial 
variables, defendants charged with killing whites were 4.3 times as likely to receive a 
death sentence in Georgia as defendants charged with killing blacks, and that black 
defendants were 1.1 times as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants” 
(McCleskey v. Kemp on or about p.1).  
The McCleskey Court weighed the accused’s claims and concluded that the 
statistical evidence presented in Baldus’s study was not clear enough to prove 
discrimination in any one case.  They also noted that the accused did not offer 
evidence of racial bias specific to his own case.  The study was insufficient to prove 
that Georgia’s capital punishment system was arbitrary and capricious in application 
and excessive in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.   
The Role of Proportionality Review
Over the last three decades the role of the proportionality review has changed.  
In 1976, the Gregg Court took note of several revisions in Georgia’s new guided 
discretion statute, including the portion assessing “whether the death sentence was 
excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering 
both the crime and the defendant.” (Gregg v. Georgia, on or about p. 1).  The Gregg 
Court approved of the provision for appellate review in the Georgia capital-
sentencing system because it “served as a check against the random or arbitrary 
imposition of the death penalty.”  Specifically, the proportionality review component 
“substantially eliminates the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the 
action of an aberrant jury,” thereby eliminating many problems noted in Furman.
The Court viewed the reforms presented in Gregg as worthy tools to improve the 
14 
administration of the death penalty.  The appellate review component could be used 
as a barometer of public opinion.  Justice Stewart further discussed this in his opinion 
(on or about p. 206): 
In particular, the proportionality review substantially eliminates the 
possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an 
aberrant jury. If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the 
death sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review 
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such 
circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.   
Gregg put the death penalty back on the books and the proportionality review played 
a seemingly important role in Georgia’s statute passing constitutional muster.  The 
impact of the Gregg decision was far-reaching.  Shortly after the decision came out, 
several states modeled their revised death penalty statutes after Georgia’s, and 
included a proportionality review component. 
Eight years after Gregg, the Court reversed itself with Pulley v. Harris when 
they declared that the proportionality review was not a constitutional necessity.  
Justice Stewart found support for this decision in Jurek v. Texas, a companion case to 
Gregg.  Stewart noted that Texas’s guided discretion statute was approved sans the 
proportionality review component at the same time Georgia’s statute was approved.  
The Texas statute narrowed its definition of capital murder by requiring “at least one 
aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder case before a death sentence may 
even be considered” (Pulley, on or about p. 49).  To the Pulley Court, this 
requirement was enough for the Texas statute to pass constitutional muster. 
Pulley acknowledged that although Gregg “made much of the statutorily 
required comparative proportionality review…this was considered an additional 
safeguard against arbitrary or capricious sentencing.”  It was further noted that while 
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the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg “suggested that some 
form of meaningful appellate review is required, those Justices did not declare that 
comparative review was so critical that without it the Georgia statute would not have 
passed constitutional muster.”  (Pulley v. Harris on or about p.46). 
Recent Research 
Several quantitative studies examining the death penalty have been published.  
These studies provide answers to previously unanswered questions and document 
growing trends across the capital punishment landscape.  Specifically, these studies 
have shed light on the factors which influence the administration of the death penalty 
and changes in public support for the death penalty.   
 Several studies explored the extralegal factors which influence the 
administration of the death penalty.  These factors include race of the victim (Bowers 
et al., 2004; Brewer, 2004; Holcomb et al., 2004; Paternoster et al., 2004; Gonzalez-
Perez, 2002; Baldus et al., 1994; Baldus et al., 1990; Baldus et al., 1998; Paternoster, 
1983;) geographic location of the crime (Paternoster et al., 2004; Paternoster, 1983),  
or even the presence of expert testimony describing the defendant as psychopathic 
(Edens et al., 2005), or an approaching judicial election (Brooks and Raphael, 2002).  
None of these factors are legally relevant. 
 Yet more changes have taken place since Pulley was handed down in 1984.  
Public opinion polls, which once offered evidence of growing public support for the 
death penalty, show a new trend supporting the sentence of life without parole in 
place of death sentences (Roberts, 2005; Unnever et al., 2005b; Vogel, 2003) as well 
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as a decrease in public support for the death penalty overall (Barkan and Cohn, 2005; 
Unnever et al., 2005a; Vollum et al., 2004). 
 This research is a relatively new addition to the death penalty discussion.  
Very few studies, if any, were available to the Court during the time of Furman, and 
Gregg. In Furman, the Court clearly stated the problem: the death penalty was being 
imposed in a capricious and arbitrary manner and required additional safeguards to 
pass constitutional muster.  The response in Gregg and its companion cases offered 
guided discretion statutes which seemingly addressed the problems in Furman. These 
revised death penalty statutes included bifurcated proceedings, and a list of agreed 
upon aggravators and mitigators meant to narrow and focus the death sentences, and 
the proportionality review and mandatory appellate review process—a means by 
which courts can measure the efficacy of the revised death sentencing system.  At the 
time of Gregg, there was a lack of research examining the effectiveness of the newly 
revised statutes.  By the time the Court heard Pulley, there was more research, but it 
was largely ignored by the majority.  In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan took 
note of this research:  
Although research methods and techniques often differ, the 
conclusions being reached are relatively clear: factors crucial, yet 
without doubt impermissibly applied, to the imposition of the death 
penalty are the race of the defendant and the race of the victim. 
 -Pulley v. Harris, on or about p. 67. 
Yet, three years later when McCleskey put the Baldus study, a major piece of 
research at the forefront of their argument, the majority again largely ignored the 
relevance of this research.  The majority held that this study did not support the 
discrimination claim in this case because it did not prove discrimination in any one 
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case, or the case of the defendant.  The McCleskey Court concluded that research 
proving system-wide discrimination was not strong enough to show discrimination in 
one particular case.   
Here we are nearly two decades after McCleskey. The legal landscape has 
changed.  The Court held that death sentences are unconstitutional for all defendants 
who committed their crime under the age of 18 (Roper v. Simmons) and all 
defendants who are mentally retarded (Atkins v. Virginia).  The trend narrowing field 
of people eligible to receive the death sentences reflects the decreasing public support 
for the death penalty and research showing the death penalty is administered in an 
uneven fashion.  In Justice Douglas’s opinion on Furman, he stated that the Eighth 
Amendment’s “cruel and unusual” punishment clause requires “legislatures to write 
penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges 
to see to it that general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to 
unpopular groups.”  Douglas further describes this matter:  
A law that stated that anyone making more than $ 50,000 would be 
exempt from the death penalty would plainly fall, as would a law that 
in terms said that blacks, those who never went beyond the fifth grade 
in school, those who made less than $ 3,000 a year, or those who were 
unpopular or unstable should be the only people executed. A law 
which in the overall view reaches that result in practice has no more 
sanctity than a law which in terms provides the same. 
-Justice Douglas’s opinion in Furman on or about p. 257. 
The proportionality reviews conducted by state courts have resulted in very 
few reversals or vacated sentences due to disproportionate treatment.  Yet, research 
has consistently shown that the death penalty is administered in an uneven manner 
with an unbalanced reliance on extra-legal factors such as race of defendant, race of 
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victim, and geography of the crime.  The proportionality review process should have 
corrected for these unbalanced sentences.  What accounts for this discrepancy?  My 
hypothesis is that the proportionality review conducted by the Maryland State 
Supreme Court does not single out and eliminate disproportionate cases as it was 
intended to do.    
There are methodological problems with the way in which the state courts 
have carried out their proportionality reviews.  The statutory requirements rarely 
included guidelines on how to conduct a proportionality review.  Given the latitude, 
most states limited their universe of cases to only those in which a death sentence was 
handed down.  This is a problem because an accurate comparison requires a larger 
universe of cases, including every case which was eligible for a death sentence based 
on the legal elements of the crime.   
The U.S. Supreme Court never intended for the administration of the death 
penalty to selectively apply to some groups more than others.  They have called for 
reforms to address the problem and ensure equal justice.  Additional research and the 
evolution of public opinion since the 1970’s provided a vehicle for change over the 
death penalty landscape.  The questions concerning unequal death sentences raised in 
Furman, Gregg, and Pulley need to be more fully addressed.  The question of 
proportionality is still an important one.  Using data collected by Ray Paternoster, I 
plan to conduct a proportionality review to determine if the death penalty in Maryland 
is being administered in a proportionate and equal fashion.  This project will include 
both a traditional and a comparative proportionality review.  In conducting a 
comparative proportionality review, the traditional proportionality review questions 
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will also be addressed.  The universe of cases in my proportionality review will 
consist of all death eligible cases.1 If the Maryland State Supreme Court has 
conducted an effective proportionality review, then the results of my proportionality 
review will yield results similar to theirs.   
 
1 “Death eligible” is defined as cases in which (a) the state’s attorney filed a notice of an intention to seek a death 
sentence, even if that notice was later withdrawn unilaterally or in exchange for a plea, or (b) the facts of the case 
clearly establish that a first-degree murder was committed, the defendant was the principal in the first degree (or 
met the principal in the second-degree exception), the defendant was eligible by age at the time of the offense, the 
defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of the offense, and the murder included at least one statutory 
aggravating circumstance. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review of Previous Proportionality 
Reviews 
Over the past three decades several proportionality reviews have been 
conducted both by state supreme courts and independent researchers in an effort to 
measure the comparative excessiveness of death sentences in some of the states who 
have chosen to impose the death penalty.  The methods and results of these 
proportionality reviews have differed.  Proportionality reviews in Georgia and South 
Carolina are reviewed below. 
The Georgia Proportionality Review
Georgia was one of the first states to include a proportionality review in their 
post-Furman capital statute.  After the Gregg Court approved their statute, many 
states followed Georgia’s example and included proportionality reviews in their 
revised capital statutes.  In 1983, Baldus and colleagues (1983; 1990) examined 
Georgia’s proportionality review by conducting an empirically-based comparative 
review of post-Furman death sentences in Georgia.  The Georgia statute lacked 
guidelines regarding its proportionality review element.  It was not clear what 
methodology the Georgia Supreme Court would use in conducting its proportionality 
review.  By the time Baldus and his colleagues conducted their proportionality review 
in 1983, it was clear that the frequency with which the Georgia Supreme Court 
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invalidated a death sentence due to comparative excessiveness was low.2 Baldus and 
his colleagues (1983 pp.679) sought to “evaluate the effectiveness of the Georgia 
Supreme Court’s system of comparative sentence review.”  More specifically, they 
wanted to determine the extent to which the actual operation of Georgia’s 
proportionality review process has ensured that no person ‘sentenced to die by the 
action of an aberrant jury’ had been put to death, as it was assumed in Gregg (Baldus 
et al., 1983). 
Georgia had been conducting a proportionality reviews as was required by 
their state death penalty statute; however, Baldus and his colleagues (1990, pp. 404) 
report that the Georgia Supreme Court had rarely vacated a death sentence “because 
of the infrequency with which death sentences occur in other similar cases.”  This 
supported the notion that Georgia showed a clear bias “in favor of findings that death 
sentences are not excessive or disproportionate.”  In an effort to determine how 
Georgia arrived at their answer to the question of excessiveness in death sentences, 
Baldus first reviewed the methodology behind the proportionality review process. 
Three Methodological Approaches to Proportionality Review 
In this review, Baldus described Georgia’s three methodological approaches 
to proportionality review and explained their limitations.  In the first method, termed 
the “reasonableness” approach, the court weighs the aggravators and mitigators of the 
case under review and makes its determination of proportionality based on the values 
and experiences of State Supreme Court justices as well as their general familiarity 
 
2 At the time of Baldus’ study, the Georgia State Supreme Court had conducted 120 proportionality 
reviews.  They had vacated 2/120 of these death sentences due to comparative excessiveness. (Baldus 
et al., 1983 pp. 711) 
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with prior cases.  In other words, the Court made a subjective argument that the 
sentence under review was “reasonable” given the known the facts of the case. The 
second method is slightly more formal.  In the “precedent-seeking” approach, the 
court declares a case appropriately proportionate “if they are able to cite one or more 
‘similar’ cases that also resulted in death sentences.” (Baldus et al., 1983).  For 
example, if the Court is reviewing a case involving an armed robbery and murder as it 
is able to identify another armed robbery-murder that resulted in a sentence of death, 
then it is able to conclude that death sentence in the case under review is not 
disproportionate because it has a precedent.  Both of these approaches are extremely 
subjective and lack an empirical basis.  Neither the “reasonableness” approach nor the 
“precedent-seeking” approach possesses the ability to determine whether or not cases 
are proportionate in an even and consistent manner.   
The “frequency” approach is more objective than previous two approaches.  It 
calls for a survey of the sentencing results in all prior cases deemed to be similar to 
the case under review.  From that universe of cases, the frequency with which death 
and life sentences result determines whether the death sentence under appeal is 
excessive or evenhanded.  There are three steps in the “frequency” approach.  First, 
the reviewing body must determine the characteristics of the universe of cases.  This 
would ideally include “all capital homicides that resulted in a conviction, and were 
therefore, death-eligible” (Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1990 pp.486).  Second, they 
select a sub-group from the universe of cases which are similar in some defined way 
to the case under review.  Third, they determine the proportion of cases in this sub-
group that resulted in a death sentence.  If the proportion of cases in the sub-group 
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that resulted in a death sentence is high, then it is reasonable to declare the death 
sentence in the case under review is proportionate.  However, if the proportion of 
death sentences in similar cases is low, then a death sentence in the case under review 
should be declared disproportionate.  The only way for the court to see the whole 
picture is to use a “frequency” approach. 
For example, think of a case where the defendant and two codefendants were 
convicted of robbing a gas station and killing the gas station attendant, but the 
defendant in the case under review wasn’t the triggerman.  The “reasonableness” 
approach or the “precedent-seeking” approach may identify one or two other cases on 
death row with similar circumstances to conclude that the case under review is 
proportionate.  However, neither of these approaches would reveal that there might be 
100 other cases with similar characteristics where the defendant received a sentence 
less than death.  A “frequency” approach would show that a death sentence is 
imposed in similar cases only 2% of the time.  The court would then conclude that a 
death sentence in this instance is disproportionate—an outcome far different than 
those resulting from a “reasonableness” approach or “precedent-seeking” approach.  
In order to adequately address the question of comparative excessiveness, it is 
imperative to conduct a true empirical proportionality review utilizing a “frequency” 
approach. 
After reviewing the methodology used by the Georgia court, and noting that 
they primarily used the “reasonableness” approach and “precedent-seeking” 
approach, Baldus also noted the value of the “frequency” approach.  In addition to 
exploring the Georgia court’s proportionality review methods, Baldus sought to 
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examine the overall question of excessiveness.  Furthermore, he was interested in 
comparing pre- and post-Furman death sentence patterns to determine whether the 
reforms brought about by Furman had reduced the level of arbitrariness and 
discrimination after the revised statute, approved in Gregg was in place.  Guidance on 
which methodology was used to identify comparable cases was absent both in the 
courts and relevant literature, Baldus identified several methods for identifying 
similar cases for the purposes of proportionality review.   He employed several of 
these methods while taking into account their limitations in order to “cross-check the 
results of each.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 681)  
Case Specific Measures of Comparative Excessiveness 
These measures fell into the two categories of “case specific” measures of 
comparative excessiveness and “system wide” measures of comparative 
excessiveness.  Baldus identified three case-specific methods of conducting a 
comparative proportionality review—the salient factors method, the main 
determinants method, and the index method.   
The Salient Factors Method 
In the first method, similar cases are chosen based on “salient factors”, or 
“those features of the case which seem most likely to have affected the jury’s 
decision.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp.681)  This is the method that the Georgia Supreme 
Court claims to use when conducting their proportionality reviews.  The problem with 
this method is that each homicide is unique and the pool of cases is sometimes too 
small for enough cases to be matched on enough factors with high enough reliability 
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to accurately select a large enough group of comparable cases.  For example, if the 
case under review involves a gas station robbery where a hostage was taken and 
killed, then there are several salient factors on which this case can be matched.  If 
there is only one other case in which a hostage was taken and killed during the course 
of a gas station robbery, but several others that include only one matching element 
such as a gas station robbery or a hostage being killed, then it becomes difficult to 
decide what to include in the comparison group.  Large comparisons groups are 
necessary to obtain a reliable proportion.  The larger the group of comparison cases, 
the lower the number of matching salient factors in that group.  Given the unique 
nature of homicide, it is very rare for homicides to share a large number of salient 
factors.  This is a limitation of the salient factors method. 
The Main Determinants Method 
The “main determinants” method uses a multiple regression analysis to define 
similarity in terms of those factual characteristics which have the strongest influence 
on the sentencing decision.  This method relies strongly on statistical analysis instead 
of subjectivity to determine similarity.  Once a multiple regression analysis shows 
which factors most significantly influenced the sentencing decisions, these significant 
factors are used to divide the group of death-eligible cases into sub-groups of similar 
cases.  The sub-groups are then ranked by seriousness according to the number of 
significant factors present.  Next, Baldus calculated the death sentence frequencies 
within each subgroup.  The frequency across groups should theoretically increase as 
the number of significant factors increased.  One limitation of this method is that a 
regression analysis “can only estimate for any given factual characteristic the average 
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impact in all cases.” (Baldus, 1983 pp. 689)  For a specific case it is not possible to 
estimate the extent to which specific factors influenced the jury’s decision to impose 
a death sentence.   
The Index Method 
The “index method” relies on the probability in each case that the defendant 
will receive a death sentence.  This method identifies the significant factors and 
weighs the relative importance of each of these factors.  Based on this number, a 
“propensity score” is computed and the cases are ranked according to the score.  The 
score represents the probability that the defendant receives a death sentence.  The 
sub-groups are composed of cases with similar scores.  The aggregate frequency is 
calculated for the cases in the sub-group.  The aggregated score represents the entire 
sub-group.  One limitation of this method is that “factual differences may exist 
between cases ranked as similar in terms of their respective index scores.” (Baldus, 
1983 pp.692)   
Systemwide Measures of Comparative Excessiveness 
Baldus identifies two main types of systemwide measures of comparative 
excessiveness—one based on legislatively prescribed criteria and another, termed 
“regression-based scales,” based on “factual characteristics which best explain the 
actual death-sentencing decisions in a multiple regression analysis.” (Baldus et al., 
1983 pp. 693) 
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Legislative Criteria Measures 
Georgia’s post-Furman revised death penalty statute3 lists several factors 
whose presence defines the case as death eligible.  This list includes factors such as 
(1) the defendant had a prior record of conviction for murder, rape, armed robbery, or 
kidnapping with bodily injury; (2) the victim was an on-duty police, corrections, or 
fire person; and (3) the murder was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or 
inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the 
victim.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 693)  This method selects as similar cases in which 
the same statutory aggravating factors are present or cases in which an equal number 
of statutory aggravating factors is present.  One limitation of this method is its failure 
to account for other aggravating factors or mitigating factors that influence the 
sentencing decision.  
Regression-based Scales 
This method utilizes a regression-based scale to calculate a predicted sentence 
index using all death-eligible cases.  The cases are then divided into groups according 
to the “predicted likelihood that a defendant would receive a death sentence”.  
(Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 694)  Regression-based measures select comparative cases 
based on all significant aggravating and mitigating circumstances included in the 
model.  One limitation to using regression-based measures is the danger of 
“overfitting”.  This is to say that “extraneous non-causal variables” may be included 
in the regression equation through chance correlation.  This may cause the results of 
 
3 GA Code Ann. § 27-2534-1 (1983) 
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the regression analysis to “exaggerate” the apparent consistency of the system which 
produced the data set used to estimate the model.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 695) 
Evaluating excessiveness levels 
Once the universe of cases is determined, the sub-groups formed based on 
similar cases, and the proportion of cases resulting in a death and life sentence is 
calculated, a decision must be made as to what proportion of death sentences is 
necessary in order for a death sentence to be deemed “excessive”.  At the time of 
Baldus’ study, the Georgia State Supreme Court had conducted 120 proportionality 
reviews since 1973.  In only two of these 120 cases had the court vacated a death 
sentence due to comparative excessiveness.  While there is no Georgia court opinion 
that provides an empirical number by which to measure comparative excessiveness, 
Baldus referenced Coley v. State, a 1974 non-fatal rape case in Georgia where the 
death sentence was vacated as comparatively excessive “based on the results of 
twelve other cases involving fourteen defendants, of whom only 36% received death 
sentences.” (Baldus, 1983 pp. 696)  Although this case pre-dated the revised Georgia 
death penalty statute, it suggests that the Georgia State Supreme Court had previously 
considered death sentences to be comparatively excessive where the death sentencing 
rate in comparison cases was lower than .36.  Similarly, if a death sentence was 
imposed in more than 80% of similar cases, then Baldus classified that sentence as 
“presumptively evenhanded.”  The instances in which a death sentence was imposed 
in similar cases between 35% and 80% of the time, it is more difficult to determine 
whether or not the sentence is disproportionate.   
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The Georgia Proportionality Review Results
Baldus and his colleagues conducted their proportionality review of two 
Georgia data sets4 using different methods.  These methods included overall 
aggravation regression based approaches and non-empirical fact specific approaches.  
The results of the death-sentencing frequencies varied depending on the measure 
used. 
Results of Systemwide Measures:  Legislative Criteria Measures 
Baldus reports that of all death-eligible defendants who were convicted, 
because of the presence of at least one statutory aggravator, .22 were sentenced to 
death.  There were two statutory categories that accounted for the majority of the 
death sentences—case with an “enumerated contemporaneous offense” and cases 
where the murder was “vile, horrible, or inhuman.”  In each of these cases the death 
sentencing rates were .34 and .29, respectively, and still well below any rate which 
could reasonably be considered evenhanded. 
When cases were grouped by the number of statutory aggravating factors 
present, 21 cases with only one or two statutory aggravating factors present received 
death sentences when the death sentence rate for comparable cases fell far below the 
.35 death sentencing rate.  Using Coley v. State [of Georgia] as a guide, these 21 
cases would have been vacated due to comparative excessiveness.  The highest death 
sentencing rate of all categories was .62 for the group with five statutory aggravating 
 
4 The first dataset consisted of 130 pre-Furman murder defendants tried and sentenced between 
January 1, 1970 and September 29, 1972.  20/130 received a death sentence.  The second data set 
consisted of 594 post-Furman defendants.  There was a penalty trial in 190 of these cases.  103/594 
death sentences were imposed.   
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factors present.  In other words, cases with five statutory aggravating factors present, 
only 62% of the cases received death sentences.  Using this method, none of the cases 
receiving death sentences would be considered evenhanded using the standard that 
the death sentencing frequency among similar cases needs to be .80 or more (see 
reproduction of Table 2).    
Reproduction of Table 2: Death Sentencing Rates and Frequencies in Georgia 
I.  Death Sentencing  Rates Controlling for the Number of Georgia Statutory Aggravating Factors 
Presenta
A.  Number of Statutory Aggravating Factors 
Presentb
B. Death Sentence Rate 
0 .0  (0/132) 
1 .03  (5/150) 
2 .12  (16/136) 
3 .37  (37/99) 
4 .53  (33/62) 
5 .62  (8/13) 
6 .50  (1/2) 
II.  Number and Proportion of Death Sentence Cases for Which the Death Sentencing Frequency in 
Similar Cases was: 
Less than .35 .21  (21/100) 
.80 or more .0  (0/100) 
a This measure refers to the number of statutory aggravating factors in the case regardless of whether they were 
found by the jury or even whether there was a penalty trial in the case. 
b The correlation coefficient between the death sentencing rate and the number of statutory aggravating factors in 
the case is .49. 
Source: Baldus, D.C., G.G. Woodworth, and C.A. Pulaski. 1983. “Comparative Review of Death 
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
Issue 774 pp. 661-753.  Table 2 reproduced from p. 700. 
Regression-based Scales 
In an analysis of post-Furman data using regression-based scales, 26 cases 
received death sentences when the death sentence rate for comparable cases was less 
than .35.  Using a logistic regression analysis, predicted death sentencing rates from 
the post-Furman data were calculated.  Results from this model predicted one death 
sentence in cases with only one or two statutory aggravating factors present—twenty-
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five less than actual number of death sentences.  This model predicts that for 37 
cases, the death sentencing frequency among similar cases would be .80 or more.  
(Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 701-702) 
Results of Case Specific Measures 
Baldus considered the salient factors method to be most relevant because it 
“most closely approximates how the Georgia court purports to review death 
sentences.” (Baldus et al., 1983, pp.703)  They reviewed sixty-eight cases which had 
previously been reviewed by the Georgia court.5 Comparable cases were selected 
based on salient factors and death sentencing rates were calculated for each group.  
Using the salient factors method, 25% (7/68) of the cases would have been deemed 
comparatively excessive because the death sentencing rate in comparable cases was 
less than .35.  In only 10% (7/68) of the cases, did the death sentencing rate in 
comparable cases exceed .80. 
The index method appeared to yield the most evenhanded results.  Half of the 
death sentences (34/68) qualified as evenhanded in that the death sentencing rate in 
comparable cases exceeded .80.  Furthermore, only 13% (9/68) of the death sentences 
would be comparatively excessive based on a death sentencing rate in comparable 
cases of less than .35. (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 704)   
The results from the main determinants method were less impressive.  The 
death sentencing rate for comparable cases was .80 or more in only thirty percent 
(19/64) of the death sentences.  Twenty-two percent (14/64) of the cases qualified as 
 
5 For each case under review Baldus and his colleagues identified a group of similar cases based on an 
average of 3.6 salient factors.  (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 703) 
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presumptively excessive as the death sentencing rate for comparable cases was less 
than .35. 
Baldus ultimately concluded that Georgia continued to impose death 
sentences which a variety of measures identified as presumptively excessive.  
Furthermore, Georgia had rarely vacated a death sentence on the grounds that it was 
excessive or disproportionate due to the infrequency of death sentences in similar 
cases.  However, the Georgia State Supreme Court had vacated cases on procedural 
grounds at a higher rate in cases where the death sentences may have been excessive; 
however, he went on to note that “this form of de facto comparative sentence review 
is not sufficient to overcome the discrepancy between the court’s sentence review 
decisions and the results of [Baldus’s] analysis.”  (Baldus, 1983 pp. 728).   
When the Georgia State Supreme Court did conduct a proportionality review, 
the comparison cases they chose were nearly always death sentence cases as opposed 
to life sentence cases.  In this “precedent-seeking” approach, the court fails to identify 
a full universe of cases that are similar to the death sentence under review.  Baldus 
reasons that this may be due to the fact that the precedent-seeking approach “more 
closely resembles the methodology of conventional legal research and analysis and 
seems more comfortable to the law-trained mind.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 720)  
Recommendations for the future include making use of “systematic, empirically-
based procedures” as well as quantitative computer-assisted methods.  Baldus 
cautions against relying too heavily on computers to determine comparability, noting 
that “it only serves as point of departure.” (Baldus et al., 1983 pp. 732)  By following 
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these recommendations, Baldus believes the reviewing court can increase the 
accuracy with which they conduct proportionality reviews.   
The South Carolina Proportionality Review
In 1990, Paternoster and Kazyaka examined the theory and practice of the 
comparative sentence review conducted by the South Carolina Supreme Court.  They 
analyzed South Carolina death penalty data from June 8, 1977 to December 31, 1981.  
Their study specifically targets a group of twenty-six cases in which the South 
Carolina Supreme Court reviewed and affirmed their death sentences.  They 
compared the sentences of the twenty-six affirmed cases with comparable cases6 from 
the same time period.   
Determining Case Comparability 
Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990, pp. 489) note that the South Carolina 
Supreme Court opinions provide “almost no insight as to the rationale for the 
sentence and the ‘meaningful’ differences between this defendant and those not 
sentenced to death.”  Paternoster and Kazyaka relied in part on previous literature, 
specifically Baldus et al. (1983) as guidance on which methodology to use to identify 
comparable cases.  In order to examine comparative excessiveness in South 
Carolina’s death sentencing patterns, they used several methods to identify similar 
cases, while taking into account the limitations of each method.  Paternoster and 
Kazyaka separate methods of case comparability into two general areas: the fact 
specific approach in which homicides maybe similar based on specific features of the 
 
6 Comparable cases included 135 cases in which the defendant was convicted of capital murder, and 
eligible for the death penalty, whether or not it resulted in a sentence of death. 
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offense and offender or the overall aggravation approach in which cases are similar 
based on similar levels of overall aggravation.7
The Fact-Specific Frequency Method 
The fact-specific frequency method is similar to the “salient factors” approach 
employed by Baldus et al. (1983) in that it relies on factors which appear to have been 
particularly relevant in the jury’s decision to impose the death sentence.  In order to 
determine which factors were relevant, Paternoster and Kazyaka reviewed the 
reviewing court’s discussion regarding the proportionality of the sentence.  If a 
member of the court mentioned a particular aspect of the case as seeming to justify 
the death sentence, it was classified as a relevant factor.  These relevant factors were 
then the basis for selecting similar cases.  Paternoster and Kazyaka note that there are 
limitations to this method.  It is difficult to identify which factors are the most 
relevant.  Even after identifying these factors, it is difficult to match enough 
comparable cases with a high number of the same similar factors.  Indeed, as the 
number of such specific factors grows, it becomes increasingly difficult to identify a 
sufficient number of cases with which to make an adequate comparative review. 
(Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1983 pp. 489) 
The Overall Aggravation Methods 
Paternoster and Kazyaka also employ an overall aggravation frequency 
method in which the measure of comparability is based on the total number of 
aggravation factors present, as identified by the logistic regression equation.  
 
7 Levels of overall aggravation incorporate all aggravating and mitigating factors present in the specific 
case. 
35 
Aggravation factors are not limited to statutory aggravators, and may include 
mitigators, if present in the case.  Each aggravation factors carries the same weight 
for the purposes of this method.   
In addition to the overall aggravation frequency method, Paternoster and 
Kazyaka also employ a second overall aggravation method, termed the “propensity 
score” approach.  It is similar to Baldus’ main determinants method in that it utilizes 
the logistic regression analysis to identify significant factors that affect the outcome 
of the dependent variable (death sentence).  This method was initially developed by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983; 1985).  The propensity score can be understood as “the 
estimated conditional probability of the defendant being sentenced to death.” 
(Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1990 pp. 491)  Each significant independent variable is 
assigned a different weight based on its predictive importance.  A propensity score is 
then created for each case from the combination of significant independent variables 
found in the case.  This propensity score represents the likelihood of a death sentence 
in each specific case.  Comparable cases are matched on the basis of their propensity 
score.   
Evaluating Excessiveness Levels 
Once cases are grouped according to their propensity score (propensity score 
method), similar numbers of significant aggravation factors (overall aggravation 
frequency method) or sub-grouped according to similar specific features of the 
offense (fact-specific frequency method), a decision must be made as to what 
proportion of death sentences is necessary in order for a death sentence to be deemed 
“excessive”.  Since the South Carolina Supreme Court offers no guidance on 
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determining excessiveness levels, Paternoster and Kazyaka noted that the Georgia 
and South Carolina death penalty statutes were very similar and chose to adopt the 
.35 or less standard used by Baldus and his colleagues in the Georgia proportionality 
review.  Generally speaking, excessive death sentences are those in which similar 
cases result in a death sentence a low percentage of the time (.35 or less).  Paternoster 
and Kazyaka (1990, pp. 493) reason that the “only way to determine if a particular 
death sentence is disproportionate in an absolute sense is to determine if juries in the 
state regularly sentence such defendants to death.”    
The South Carolina Proportionality Review Results
Paternoster and Kazyaka compared twenty-six affirmed death sentence cases 
in South Carolina to comparable cases in an effort to identify comparatively excessive 
death sentences.  They used three different methods, one fact-specific approach 
measure and two overall aggravation measures of comparability. Results varied 
depending on the method used. 
Results of the Fact-Specific Frequency Method 
In the fact-specific frequency method, the results are presented separately for 
each case.  The individual results are accompanied by a summary analysis of the 
number and proportion of affirmed death sentences at different levels of death 
sentence frequency.  (Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1983 pp. 496)  A determination of 
proportionality is made in a fact-specific frequency analysis if the affirmed capital 
cases fall into categories where death is the regularly applied sentence.  Conversely, if 
affirmed capital cases fall into categories where life sentences are more frequently 
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applied than death sentences, it can be concluded that death sentences are being 
imposed in a disproportionate manner.  The fact-specific frequency analysis reveals 
that there is “considerable variation in the proportionality of the death sentences.” 
(Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1983 pp. 498)  The researchers identify ten cases in which 
the death sentencing rate for comparable cases is at least .60.  They conclude that the 
imposition of a death sentence is not excessive in these cases.  Variation becomes 
apparent when the rest of the affirmed cases are examined.  Paternoster and Kazyaka 
classify a larger proportion of the affirmed cases as comparatively excessive because 
the death sentencing rates are much lower—in some cases only .07 or .11.  The large 
number of these comparatively excessive death sentences supports the notion that the 
South Carolina Supreme Court is not conducting proportionality reviews which 
effectively identify disproportionate sentences. 
Paternoster and Kazyaka’s fact-specific frequency analysis results from South 
Carolina were similar to Baldus and his colleagues’ results from Georgia.  The 
percentage of comparatively excessive death sentences in South Carolina was 35%, 
whereas Baldus found 25% of all cases were comparatively excessive.8 Paternoster 
and Kazyaka also found that the death sentencing rate was greater than .50 in 38% of 
the South Carolina cases.  Baldus found that 40% of the Georgia cases reviewed had a 
death sentencing rate of .50 or more.   
 
8 Cases were deemed comparatively excessive when a group of similar cases had death sentencing 
rates of less than .35.  This definition is used by both Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990) and Baldus et al. 
(1983). 
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Results of Two Overall Aggravation Analyses 
The two overall aggravation methods rely on a logistic regression analysis 
which identified significant factors that affect the outcome of the dependent variable 
(death sentence).  Results of the logistic regression analysis identify the following 
legally relevant factors that significantly affect the imposition of the death penalty: 
(1) the number of offenders; (2) presence of mitigating circumstances; (3) the use of a 
handgun in the killing; (4) the brutality of the homicide; and (5) the number of felony 
offenses committed by the defendant during the murder.  Paternoster and Kazyaka 
(1990 pp. 503) report that the estimated logistic regression equation is a good fit, and 
that the equation “improves the prediction of the outcome event over chance (based 
on marginal distributions) by over 70%.”     
The Overall Aggravation Frequency Method 
The overall aggravation frequency method uses the results of the logistic 
regression analysis to identify which factors significantly affect the imposition of the 
death sentence.  Each capital murder case is assigned a score measuring the overall 
aggravation based on the number of significant factors present from one to five.9
Cases were classified as comparable if they possess the same number of significant 
aggravating factors.  Results from this method will be discussed below with the 
results of the propensity score method. 
 
9 Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990 pp. 503) note that the absence of a mitigating factor was scored as 
one. 
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The Overall Aggravation Propensity Score Method 
Next, the overall aggravation propensity score method also utilized the results 
of the logistic regression analysis.  A separate propensity score for each case was 
obtained “by summing the value of the logistic coefficients (plus the constant) for 
each aggravation factor that was present.” (Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1990 pp. 504)  
Unlike the overall aggravation frequency method, each case in the propensity score 
method was assigned a unique weighted average (or propensity score) based on the 
unique significant factors present in that specific case.  Comparable cases are 
identified as cases with identical or very similar propensity scores.  A reproduction of 
Table 5 from Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990 pp. 504-505) illustrates the results of 
both overall aggravation methods. 
Reproduction of Table 5:  
Proportion of Defendant Receiving a Death Sentence Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases 
Where Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score (Column 1) and 
Number of Aggravation Factors (Column 2) 
A. Case Analysis (1)                                                       (2) 
Case Overall Propensity Score Number of Aggravation Factors 
State v. Shaw 9/11 (.818) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Hyman 1/12 (.083) 3/32 (.094) 
State v. Gilbert 1/7 (.143) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Thompson 1/7 (.143) 4/51 (.078) 
State v. Butler 1/19 (.053) 4/51 (.078) 
State v. Copeland 9/11 (.818) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Woomer 9/11 (.818) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Yates 1/19 (.053) 4/51 (.078) 
State v. Adams 1/5 (.200) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Spann 1/5 (.200) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Plath 9/11 (.818) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Koon 1/12 (.083) 3/32 (.094) 
State v. Patterson 4/11 (.364) 4/51 (.078) 
State v. Truesdale 7/9 (.778) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Chaffee 9/11 (.818) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Gaskins 1/18 (.056) 3/32 (.094) 
State v. Lucas 1/10 (.100) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Singleton 4/11 (.364) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Skipper 1/18 (.056) 3/32 (.094) 
State v. Damon 1/5 (.200) 4/51 (.078) 
State v. Elmore 8/12 (.667) 13/16 (.813) 
State v. Plemmons 1/10 (.100) 3/32 (.094) 
40 
State v. South 3/17 (.176) 3/32 (.094) 
State v. Jones 4/11 (.364) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Smith 1/5 (.200) 6/31 (.194) 
State v. Kornahrens 2/11 (.182) 4/51 (.078) 
B. Overall Propensity Summary: Proportion of Death Sentences Within Groups of Comparables 
cases by Overall Propensity: Affirmed Cases Only 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in this Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death 
Cases 
Less than .35 16 62% 
.36 - .50 3 12% 
.51 -.75 1 4% 
.76 – 1.00 6 23% 
C.  Number of Aggravation Factors Summary: Proportion of Death Sentence  Within Groups of 
Comparable Cases by Number of Aggravation Factors: Affirmed Death Cases Only 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in this Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death 
Cases 
Less than .35 19 73% 
.36 - .50   
.51 -.75   
.76 – 1.00 7 27% 
Source: Paternoster, R. and A.M. Kazyaka. 1990. “An Examination of Comparatively Excessive Death 
Sentences in South Carolina 1979-1987,” Review of Law and Social Change Issue 17 pp. 475-533.  
Table 5 was reproduced from pp. 504-505 with the author’s permission. 
The overall aggravation propensity score method and the overall aggravation 
frequency method yielded similar results in that the proportion of cases resulting in a 
death sentence in the pool most similar to the one being reviewed is approximately 
the same using both methods, though this is most likely due to the fact that they were 
based on the same regression results.  Generally speaking, defendants in cases that are 
extremely violent are consistently given death sentences while defendants in the less-
brutal capital crimes rarely receive death sentences.   
The results of the two overall aggravation measures differ most from the 
fact-specific method in cases at the middle-range of aggravation, where the overall 
aggravation analyses more often lead to the conclusion that death sentences were 
comparatively excessive.  As a result, the propensity scoring method and the overall 
aggravation frequency method suggest that “over 60% of the twenty-six affirmed 
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death cases should be characterized as comparatively excessive, while only 35% of 
the cases were deemed disproportionate by the fact-specific method.” (Paternoster 
and Kazyaka, 1983 pp. 506)   
When the South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the same twenty-six death 
sentences for proportionality, they concluded that every single sentence was 
proportionate.  Paternoster and Kazyaka explore the reasons for this discrepancy by 
examining the theory and method of proportionality review used by the South 
Carolina Supreme Court.  The researchers make note of the limitations of the court’s 
methods, specifically where the South Carolina court excludes life sentences from the 
universe of comparable cases.  This makes it impossible for the court to accurately 
determine whether a death sentence is regularly imposed in comparable cases.  
Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990, pp. 526) recommend that the South Carolina 
Supreme Court ensure proportionality through a more empirical comparative review 
process.   
 Additional Research
As the Georgia and South Carolina proportionality reviews made clear, much 
of the success in identifying disproportionate death sentences lies in defining an 
appropriate universe of comparable cases.  Once the universe is expanded to include 
life sentences in addition to death sentences, the picture becomes much clearer and 
adds objectivity to the decision of disproportionality.  South Carolina and Georgia 
were two of several states that construct their universe of only death sentences; 
however, there are some states that include life sentences in their comparison cases 
for the purpose of proportionality reviews.  Research reveals that states who limit 
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their universe of cases to death sentences have a much lower rate of vacating 
excessive cases than those states that include life sentences in their universe of case 
(Sprenger, 1988).  Despite this, some states have minimized the importance of 
including life sentences in the universe of cases (Wallace and Sorensen, 1998; 
Bienen, 1996).  States may forgo thorough comparative proportionality reviews and 
claim that finding comparable cases is too difficult (White, 1999; Latzer, 2001; 
Mandery, 2002).  However, White (1999) points out that this is no more difficult than 
determining punitive damages awards in civil cases.  Furthermore, several researchers 
have demonstrated that the proportionality of death sentence application can be 
effectively evaluated with an empirical proportionality review (Paternoster and 
Kazyaka, 1990; Baldus et al., 1983; Wallace and Sorensen, 1998).  While previous 
research has revealed some important information concerning proportionality review, 
the next step in evaluating the effectiveness of the Maryland State Supreme Court’s 
proportionality review is to understand the role of proportionality review in the 
history of capital punishment in Maryland. 
The History of Capital Punishment in Maryland 
Prior to 1972, Maryland’s capital punishment statute was similar to other state 
statutes at the time in that it lacked guidelines to steer the sentencing body in 
determining appropriate penalties.  Additionally, the Maryland statute stated that for 
defendants found guilty of rape and murder, the sentence would be death unless the 
jury who determined guilt specifically stated that the death penalty was not an option.  
The Furman decision invalidated standardless capital punishment statutes, including 
Maryland’s.  In response to Furman, Maryland, along with several other states, 
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revised their capital punishment statute in an effort to include standards for the 
sentencing body in capital cases.  Specifically, Maryland limited the crimes in which 
a death sentence could be imposed to those in which a jury consider determines that 
one or more of the following aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable 
doubt: 
Aggravator 1: One or more persons committed the murder of a law enforcement 
officer while the officer was performing the officer's duties. 
Aggravator 2: The defendant committed the murder while confined in a correctional 
facility. 
Aggravator 3: The defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape from, 
an attempt to escape from, or an attempt to evade lawful arrest, 
custody, or detention by (a) a guard or officer of a correctional facility; 
or (b) a law enforcement officer. 
Aggravator 4: The victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of an 
abduction, kidnapping, or an attempt to abduct or kidnap. 
Aggravator 5: The victim was an abducted child. 
Aggravator 6: The defendant committed the murder under an agreement or contract 
for remuneration or promise of remuneration to commit the murder. 
Aggravator 7: The defendant employed or engaged another to commit the murder and 
the murder was committed under an agreement or contract for 
remuneration or promise of remuneration. 
Aggravator 8: The defendant committed the murder while under a sentence of death 
or imprisonment for life. 
Aggravator 9: The defendant committed more than one murder in the first degree 
arising out of the same incident.  
Aggravator 10: The defendant committed the murder while committing, or attempting 
to commit: (a) arson in the first degree; (b) carjacking or armed 
carjacking; (c) rape in the first degree; (d) robbery under § 3-402 or § 
3-403 of this article; or (e) sexual offense in the first degree. 
 
If the court or jury does not find that one or more of the aggravating circumstances 
exist beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall state that conclusion in writing and a death 
sentence may not be imposed.  If the court or jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt 
that one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed above, it then shall consider 
whether any of the following mitigating circumstances exists based on a 
preponderance of the evidence: 
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Mitigator 1: The defendant previously has not been found guilty of a crime of 
violence. 
Mitigator 2: The defendant previous entered a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere 
to a charge of a crime of violence. 
Mitigator 3: The defendant previously received probation before judgment for a crime 
of violence. 
Mitigator 4: The victim was a participant in the conduct of the defendant or consented 
to the act that caused the victim's death. 
Mitigator 5: The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination, or provocation 
of another, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to 
the prosecution. 
Mitigator 6: The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that 
conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired due to 
emotional disturbance, mental disorder, or mental incapacity. 
Mitigator 7: The defendant was of a youthful age at the time of the murder. 
Mitigator 8: The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's 
death. 
Mitigator 9: It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity 
that would be a continuing threat to society. 
Mitigator 10: Any other fact that the court or jury specifically sets forth in writing as 
a mitigating circumstance in the case. 
 
If the court or jury finds that one or more of the mitigating circumstances 
listed above exist, it determines whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the 
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of evidence.  If the court or jury finds 
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death 
sentence shall be imposed.  If the court or jury finds that the aggravating 
circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may 
not be imposed.  If the determination is by a jury, a decision to impose a death 
sentence must be unanimous and shall be signed by the jury foreperson.  A court or 
jury shall put its determination in writing and specifically state (i) each aggravating 
circumstance found; (ii) each mitigating circumstance found; (iii) whether any 
aggravating circumstances found outweigh the mitigating circumstances found; 
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(iv) whether the aggravating circumstances found do not outweigh the mitigating 
circumstances found; and (v) the sentence. 
This list of aggravators and mitigators provided to guide the sentencing body 
through their sentencing decision was Maryland’s answer to the issues raised in 
Furman. When Gregg and its progeny were decided in 1976, the Maryland 
legislature revised their capital statute for the second time that decade, eliminating the 
requirement of a mandatory death sentence10 for specific crimes, and adding further 
provisions similar to those in the Georgia capital punishment statute which passed 
constitutional muster.  Maryland was not alone in following Georgia’s example.  
Many states patterned their revised statutes after Georgia’s guided discretion statute.  
One on the elements Maryland imitated was the section requiring a proportionality 
review.  Specifically, the revised Maryland death penalty statute, section 414(e)(4) 
states in full: 
(e) Considerations by Court of Appeals.  In addition to the 
consideration of any errors properly before the Court on appeal, the 
Court of Appeals shall consider the imposition of the death sentence.  
With regard to the sentence, the Court shall determine: 
 (4) whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering 
both the crime and the defendant. 
 As noted in Tichnell I (287 Md. At 738-39), the proportionality review 
provisions in the Maryland statute reflected those in the Georgia statute.  In this way, 
Maryland’s legislated guidelines for conducting a proportionality review were 
 
10 The elimination of the mandatory element was reaffirmed in Mills v. State, which stated that the 
Maryland capital punishment statute does not require the death sentence if the jury believes death to be 
inappropriate and it is not a mandatory death penalty statute. Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 527 A.2d 3 
(1987), vacated and remanded, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S. Ct. 1860, 100 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1988). 
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meager.  When discussing the purpose of the proportionality review, one State 
Supreme Court Justice cited the following passage from the Gregg decision: 
[The proportionality review] substantially eliminates the possibility 
that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury. 
If a time comes when juries generally do not impose the death 
sentence in a certain kind of murder case, the appellate review 
procedures assure that no defendant convicted under such 
circumstances will suffer a sentence of death.  
–Gregg v. Georgia on or about 
pp.206 
It was clear that a proportionality review was a requirement; however, it was 
unclear how the court should determine proportionality.  Since the Maryland death 
penalty statute was ambiguous regarding the proper manner in which to conduct a 
proportionality review, it was not surprising that this became an issue on appeal.  In 
the 1982 case of Tichnell v. State11, one appellant objected to the state’s method of 
picking the universe of cases from which the comparison cases were selected.  The 
appellant argued that the universe of cases should include all death-eligible cases, not 
just those in which a death sentence was imposed.  The Maryland State Supreme 
Court considered the issue and thought otherwise.  In the Tichnell (IV) opinion, the 
state addressed this ambiguity and stated that it was unnecessary, and in fact, 
improper to use every first degree murder case as a basis for comparison.  They 
further asserted that cases in which the death penalty was not sought, despite the 
 




presence of a qualifying aggravating factor are not comparable because the 
sentencing authority never considered whether death should be imposed.12 
In the 1984 case of Pulley v. Harris the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the 
proportionality review was not a constitutional necessity.  Since Pulley, some states 
have preserved the comparative proportionality review element in their death penalty 
statute while other states have not.  David Baldus and his colleagues noted a small 
trend after Pulley whereby a few states repealed the statutory requirement of 
comparative proportionality review (Baldus, 1990 p. 280).  In 1992, Maryland joined 
the states that chose to repeal the proportionality review provision in their death 
penalty statute.  Chapter 331 of the Acts of 1992, effective October 1, 1992, deleted 
subsection (e)(4) of § 414.  Consequently, the Maryland State Supreme Court no 
longer needed to determine "Whether the sentence of death is excessive or 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime 
and the defendant."  From October 1, 1992 until the present, proportionality reviews 
have not been constitutionally mandated; thus, the Maryland State Supreme Court 
ceased to include them in the overall appellate review process for capital cases. 
 
12 Even after Tichnell (IV), the Maryland State Supreme Court chose to include some death eligible 
cases which had not received a death sentence in their proportionality reviews. 
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Chapter 3: The Methods 
This proportionality review project utilizes a non-experimental research 
design.  There are two general types of approaches used to conduct proportionality 
reviews—the fact-specific approach and the overall aggravation approach.  The fact-
specific approach is non-empirical and generally relies on the subjectivity of the 
members of the State Supreme Court.  The overall aggravation approach relies on 
empirical methods, specifically logistic regression analysis to select comparison 
cases.  There are several different variations of both approaches.  Previous 
proportionality reviews have employed one or both methods to varying degrees.  
State Supreme Courts mainly utilize fact-specific approaches while independent 
researchers often choose the overall aggravation approaches, or types.  This project 
utilizes the fact-specific “salient factors” method and the overall aggravation 
“propensity score” method to analyze the data and determine if any death sentences 
are disproportionate.   
The Sample
The dataset used for this proportionality review analysis includes detailed 
information on the death eligible murders in Maryland from 1978-1999.  These data 
were collected and analyzed for a previous study of capital sentencing in Maryland 
(See Paternoster et al., 2004 and Paternoster and Brame, 2003).  The data were 
collected from a variety of sources in Maryland.  These sources included Maryland 
Division of Corrections (MDOC) files, which contained an in-depth description of the 
offense, crime scene, and criminal history.  MDOC files frequently included a pre-
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sentence investigation report (PSI) on the defendant’s educational, social, mental 
health, and educational history.  The PSI also frequently contained similar 
information for the victim’s history and demographic information.  Maryland State’s 
Attorneys offices files and police reports confirmed and added details regarding 
demographic information for victims and defendants or background details for the 
crime. Details of the evidence presented at trial were collected from court transcripts 
and trial judge reports on file with the Clerk of the Maryland Court of Appeals. 
Homicide victim information was obtained from the Maryland Office of Public 
Health. With information from these different data sources, a fairly comprehensive 
picture of each homicide was created. (For a full description, see Paternoster et al., 
2004, pp. 16-17.) 
Defining “death eligible” cases 
Using the information obtained from the data sources described above, a 
“death eligible” determination was made based on criteria listed in the state’s death 
penalty statute, without regard to the state’s attorneys’ decision to pursue a death 
sentence.  Paternoster and Brame (2003) note that “in one sense the only true way to 
categorize a murder as eligible for the death penalty is if the state’s attorney 
determines that the case meets all of the eligibility requirements as listed in the state 
statute.”  They list the following requirements: 
• The defendant was a principal in the first degree and the state could prove this 
beyond a reasonable doubt, 
• The defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of the offense (after May 
of 1989) and the state could prove this with a preponderance of the evidence, 
• The defendant was not less than 18 years old at the time of the offense (after 
June of 1987), 
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• The murder also included at least one statutory aggravating circumstance and 
the state could prove this beyond a reasonable doubt, 
• The state’s attorney files a notice 30 days prior to trial of the state’s intention 
to seek a death sentence and then a notification to seek a sentence of death is 
filed. 
 
A case may meet the first four requirements above; however, due to the needs 
and resources of the state’s attorneys’ office in a given jurisdiction, the state may 
forgo the chance to pursue a death sentence.  The state’s attorney holds a great deal of 
discretion in prosecutorial decision making.  Several factors independent of the 
homicide may influence the decision to seek a death sentence.  Consequently, it is 
possible for a case to meet all of the statutory criteria to be death eligible, without a 
death sentence being pursued.  Paternoster and Brame (2003, p.15) were interested in 
“examining the factors that explain the state’s attorneys’ decision to seek death in 
some death eligible cases but not others” so they used a definition of death eligible 
which did not include the filing of a formal notice to seek death.  They defined cases 
as death eligible if: 
The state’s attorney filed a notice of an intention to seek a death sentence, even if that 
notice was later withdrawn unilaterally or in exchange for a plea. 
The facts of the case clearly established that a first degree murder was committed, the 
defendant was the principal in the first degree, the defendant was eligible by age at 
the time of the offense, the defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of the 
offense, and the murder included at least one statutory aggravating circumstance. 
Progression of Cases through the Maryland Death Penalty System 
From 1978, the year in which Maryland’s current death penalty statute took 
effect to the point when data collection for the initial study began in the fall of 1999, 
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there was an initial pool of approximately 6,000 homicides in the state of Maryland.  
Paternoster et al. (2004, p.3) examined the influence of race and geography at five 
stages in the Maryland’s capital punishment system: 
• The point at which a case is deemed death eligible by the two criteria 
defined by Paternoster et al. (2004);  
• The decision of the state’s attorney to file a formal notification to seek 
a death sentence; 
• The decision of the state’s attorney to not withdraw a death 
notification once filed, in other words, the decision to make the death 
notification “stick” to the offender; 
• The decision of the state’s attorney to advance a death-eligible offense 
to a penalty trial upon a conviction for first-degree murder; and 
• The decision of the jury or judge to sentence a defendant to death. 
 
The universe of death eligible cases (stage 1) was trimmed down by clearly 
defining the terms of a “death eligible” case.  For the purpose of their research, 
Paternoster et al., (2004) defined a case to be death eligible if it fit one of two criteria:  
(1) The state's attorney filed a notice of an intention to seek a death sentence, even if 
that notice was later withdrawn unilaterally or in exchange for a plea; or, (2) the facts 
of the case clearly established that a first-degree murder was committed, the 
defendant was the principal in the first degree (or met the principle in the second-
degree exception), the defendant was eligible by age at the time of the offense, the 
defendant was not mentally retarded at the time of the offense, and the murder 
included at least one statutory aggravating circumstance.  
The universe of death eligible cases (stage 1) was trimmed down from 
approximately 6,000 homicides from July 1, 1978 thru December 31, 1999 to 1,311 
homicides.  Initially included in the universe of 6,000 homicides was a pool of 
approximately 300 homicide cases where the state's attorney did not file a notification 
to seek a death sentence and the issue of death eligibility based upon the available 
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facts of the case was unclear.  Specifically for these cases, it was not clear if the 
defendant was the principal in the first degree in the killing, or if there was a statutory 
aggravating circumstance present to make the homicide death eligible.  Paternoster et 
al., (2004) dealt with the ambiguity by employing the assistance of experts to 
determine death eligibility in these cases.  Each of these cases were submitted to a 
panel of attorneys who had experience in death penalty cases for review.  This panel 
consisted of a roughly equal number of state's attorneys, public defenders, and private 
lawyers who have handled death penalty cases as former prosecutors, public 
defenders or as private defense counsel (Paternoster et al., 2004).  The panel rated 
each case independently as to whether it was death eligible.  If a majority of the panel 
members rated a case as death eligible, and stated that they were moderately 
confident in their decision, the case was added to the body of death eligible cases.  Of 
the three hundred questionable cases, fewer than fifty were ultimately classified as 
death eligible and included in the group of 1,311. 
Of these 1,311 death eligible cases, the state’s attorney filed a formal 
notification to seek a death sentence (stage 2) in only 353 of these cases.  Of the 353 
cases where a formal notification was filed, the prosecutor did not retract it (stage 3) 
in 213 cases.  Of the 213 cases in which the prosecutor did not retract the notice to 
seek the death penalty, 180 advanced to a penalty trial (stage 4).  Of the 180 that 
advanced to a penalty trial, 76 received a death sentence (stage 5).  The conditional 
and unconditional probabilities for the five stages are shown in Table 1. 
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Table 1: Conditional and Unconditional Probabilities of Cases Progressing Through 







Stage 1: case defined as death eligible 1,311 --- --- 
Stage 2: prosecutor files notice of intent to seek 
death 
353 0.27 (353/1311) 0.27 (353/1311) 
Stage 3: notice of intent is not retracted 215 0.61 (215/353) 0.16 (215/1311) 
Stage 4: death-noticed cases advance to penalty 
trial 
180 0.84 (180/215) 0.14 (180/1311) 
Stage 5: penalty trial cases receiving death 
sentences 
76 0.42 (76/180) 0.058 (76/1311) 
The probability that a prosecutor seeks a death sentence, given that a case is 
death eligible is .27 (353/1311).  This means that a formal notice of intent to seek the 
death penalty is filed in less than 1/3 of all death eligible cases.  The conditional 
probability that this notice is not retracted is .61 (215/353).  In other words, of the 
notice to seek the death penalty “stuck” in roughly 60% of the cases where the notice 
was initially filed.  The conditional probability of a death-noticed case advancing to 
penalty trial was .84 (180/253).  This is to say that nearly 85% of all death-noticed 
cases advanced to penalty trial.  The conditional probability of a case resulting in a 
death sentence, given that that it advanced to penalty trial was .42 (76/180).   
The unconditional probabilities show a slightly different picture.  The 
probability that a prosecutor does not retract the notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty in a death eligible case is .16(215/1311).  The probability that a death eligible 
case advances to penalty trial is .14(180/1311).  Finally, the probability that a death 
eligible case receives a death sentence is .058(76/1311).  Indeed, of all the homicide 
cases that were eligible for the death penalty in Maryland from 1978-1999, the 
defendant received a death sentence less than 6% of the time.   
54 
Analytic Strategy of the Current Research
The Maryland death penalty statute included a proportionality review element 
from 1978 to 1992.  During this time, the Maryland State Supreme Court was 
constitutionally mandated to evaluate comparative excessiveness among death 
sentences and vacate any sentences they deemed to be disproportionate.  Yet the 
Maryland State Supreme Court has not vacated even one death sentence due to 
disproportionality.  If the Maryland State Supreme Court conducted proportionality 
reviews effectively, then it is reasonable to assume that the death sentences affirmed 
from 1978 to 1992 are consistently more violent than the death eligible cases that 
received a sentence less than death.  However, if the Maryland State Supreme Court 
failed in their efforts to identify and vacate comparatively excessive death sentences, 
then the 76 death sentences affirmed by the Maryland State Supreme Court may not 
be the “worst of the worst.”  The purpose of the current research is to determine 
whether or not the Maryland State Supreme Court identified and affirmed only the 
“worst of the worst” homicides.  In order to determine how Maryland arrived at their 
answer to the question of excessiveness, it is important to review the methodology 
behind Maryland’s proportionality review process.   
The Fact-specific “Salient Factors” Method  
Several state courts including Maryland, commonly utilize non-empirical fact-
specific approaches whereby they compare the case under review to previous cases 
they recall to be similar.  In one such method, termed the “salient factors” approach, 
similar cases are chosen for comparison based on “salient factors”, or “those features 
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of the case which seem most likely to have affected the jury’s decision.” (Baldus et 
al., 1983 pp.681).   
Language from several Maryland State Supreme Court opinions demonstrates 
the use of the fact-specific “salient factors” method.  For example, in Thomas v. State 
[of Maryland], the justices note: 
We have carefully reviewed the relevant inventory of capital 
sentencing cases and have selected a number which we deem similar 
to that of the appellant, bearing in mind, of course, that simply because 
dissimilarities exist between cases does not mean that the Court is 
powerless to complete the comparative review process contemplated 
by § 414(e)(4). 
They go on to summarize the elements of the similar cases.  They offer no 
justification for selecting comparison cases, nor is there a distinct commonality 
apparent in the summaries.  Some of the defendants in the comparison cases were 
sentenced to death and some were sentenced to life.  Despite the finding in Tichnell 
(IV), which found that proportionality reviews need only utilize a universe of cases 
consisting of other death sentences, the Maryland State Supreme Court continued to 
include both life sentences and death sentences in its group of comparison cases.  
However, the selection method of comparison cases and weight given to salient 
factors appears arbitrary.  That is to say, the Maryland State Supreme Court offers no 
explanation of how or why they select comparison cases to measure comparative 
excessiveness. 
The language in Thomas is generally consistent with every other 
proportionality review section of the Maryland death sentence cases; therefore, the 
method by which the Maryland State Supreme Court conducts their proportionality 
review can best be described as the salient factors method. 
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There are two problems with this approach.  First, this method is entirely 
subjective, relying solely on the values and experiences of the members of the State 
Supreme Court.  Regardless of how similar an older case may be, it will not be 
included in the group of comparison cases if members of the State Supreme Court do 
not remember it.  The second problem with this method is that each homicide is 
unique and the pool of cases is sometimes too small for enough cases to be matched 
on a sufficient number of factors with high enough reliability to accurately select a 
large enough group of comparable cases.  Given the unique nature of homicide, it is 
very rare for homicides to share a large number of salient factors.   
For the first part of this proportionality review project, I use the fact-specific 
“salient factors” method in an effort to replicate the results of the Maryland State 
Supreme Court.  Factors which appear to be relevant in the court’s opinion are 
considered “salient.”  Comparison cases are matched based on the salient factors and 
drawn from the universe of cases consisting of the1,311 homicides previously 
identified as death eligible.  If the probability of receiving a death sentence among 
comparable cases is less than .35, then the case under review will be is comparatively 
excessive.   
As previous research has shown, there are several ways to conduct 
proportionality reviews (Baldus et al., 1983; 1990; Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1990; 
Wallace and Sorensen, 1998).  In addition to the “salient factors” method, I conducted 
an overall aggravation “propensity score” method to further evaluate the comparative 
excessiveness among Maryland death sentences. 
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The Overall Aggravation “Propensity Score” Method 
Previously used by Paternoster and Kazyaka in their proportionality review of 
South Carolina death sentences, the propensity score method is an empirically based 
method of selecting comparison cases.  First, I constructed a logistic regression 
equation using explanatory variables and death sentence as the outcome variable.  I 
will be able to discuss the variables included in the logistic regression model after I 
have identified which are significant.  These significant factors include the aspects 
such as the presence of multiple victims or the presence of prior violent convictions in 
the defendant’s criminal history.  Each significant independent variable was assigned 
a different weight based on its predictive importance.  In other words, a propensity 
score was calculated by “summing the value of the logistic coefficients (plus the 
constant) for each aggravation factor that was present.” (Paternoster and Kazyaka, 
1990 pp. 504).  This propensity score represents the likelihood of a death sentence in 
each specific case.  The propensity score can also be understood as “the estimated 
conditional probability of the defendant being sentenced to death.” (Paternoster and 
Kazyaka, 1990 pp. 491)  Comparable cases were matched based on their propensity 
score.  Each death eligible case was ranked by propensity score and then divided into 
groups of comparable cases based on the propensity score. 
After the cases are divided into groups, the probability of receiving a death 
sentence was calculated for each group. Ideally, the death sentences are generally 
consistent within each group of comparable cases so that groups with a high 
propensity score which are the most egregious would predictably have a high 
proportion of death sentences.  Conversely, groups with low propensity scores are 
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more likely to have a low proportion of death sentences, if any at all. In theory, there 
should be a positive relationship between propensity score and probability of death 
sentence.  As the seriousness between groups increases, so should the proportion of 
the cases in which the defendant receives a death sentence.   
Defining Comparative Excessiveness 
After ranking the sentences and grouping them with comparable cases 
according to propensity score, I examined each group to check for deviations from the 
predicted positive relationship.  If there is a group where the probability of death 
sentences is lower than .35, then I considered the death sentences in that group 
comparatively excessive because 65% of cases with similar propensity scores did not 
also receive a death sentence.  Adopting .35 as the cutoff for identifying 
comparatively excessive death sentences is consistent with Paternoster and Kazyaka’s 
(1990) proportionality review in South Carolina and the Georgia proportionality 
review conducted by Baldus et al., (1983).  Initially used by Baldus and his 
colleagues, .35 was based on Coley v. State [of Georgia], a 1974 non-fatal rape case 
in which the Georgia State Supreme Court vacated the death sentence due to 
comparative excessiveness because 36% of similar defendants received a death 
sentence.  Paternoster and Kazyaka justified using the same measure of comparative 
excessiveness (.35) because South Carolina case law and statutory guidelines are 
silent when it comes to defining comparative excessiveness and Georgia and South 
Carolina’s death penalty statutes were remarkably similar.  Resembling South 
Carolina, Maryland’s death penalty statute and court opinions lack a definition of 
comparative excessiveness.  Additionally, Maryland’s death penalty statute is 
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modeled after Georgia’s statute and similar to South Carolina’s statute.  On these 
grounds, it is reasonable to assume that comparative excessiveness as it was measured 
in Georgia is an appropriate gauge for measuring comparative excessiveness in 
Maryland. 
Similarly, Baldus and his colleagues (1983) have identified death sentences 
that were not comparatively excessive as those which the death sentencing rate for 
similar cases was greater than or equal to .80.  This is to say that at least 80% of 
similar cases also received a death sentence.  Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990) chose a 
benchmark of .6 or more to signify proportionate sentences.  I adopted a more 
conservative measure of .8 to identify cases which are not comparatively excessive.  
Ideally, the 5.8% of death eligible cases in Maryland that received a death sentence 
are the “worst of the worst” and have a death sentencing rate among comparable 
cases of .80 or higher. 
Admittedly, defining comparative excessiveness is a tricky endeavor.  Since 
the courts have not presented a clear classification of proportionality, several different 
preferences exist.  Although defining comparative excessiveness is extremely 
subjective, a reasonableness standard is sufficient in determining proportionality at 
the margins.  For instance, if 1 out of 100 similar cases receive a death sentence, it is 
reasonable to classify that sentence as excessive.  Along the same lines, if 95 or 99 
out of 100 similar cases received a death sentence, it is fair to say that a death 
sentence is imposed regularly and thus proportionate in this instance.  Disagreement 
arises when the probability is closer to the middle of the range.  If around half of all 
similar cases received a death sentence, is the case under review excessive, or 
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proportionate?  Currently, there is no method available to adequately assess the 
proportionality of cases which fall in this middle range.  For this reason, I will assess 
the proportionality of cases closer to the margins.  If the proportion of similar cases 
receiving a death sentence is lower than .35, I classify the case under review as 
comparatively excessive because it is reasonable by the standards of previous 
researchers.  I selected .8 as the benchmark for determining proportionate cases for 
the same reasons.   
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Chapter 4: Analysis 
Trends in the Direct Appeal Process in Maryland 1979-1999
The capital cases sentenced between 1979 and 1999 in Maryland were 
reversed on direct appeal a little less than half of the time.  Table 2 and Figure 1 
provide a breakdown of the results of the direct appeals for these death sentences.  
The reversal of a conviction is the least common result, with only slightly more 
appeals resulting in a reversal of sentence, judgment otherwise affirmed.  Figure 1 
depicts the overall trend of affirmed death sentences as decreasing from the mid 
1980’s to 2003.   







































Reversal of Conviction Reversal of Sentence Affirmed
This decrease could be due to fewer overall death sentences.  The decline of 
affirmed death sentences over the last two decades of the twentieth century could also 
reflect diminished public support for capital punishment or the increasing number of 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions limiting the use of the death penalty in specific 
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situations.  For example, in the 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the death penalty is unconstitutional for the rape of an adult woman 
when the victim was not killed.  In 1986, the Court banned the execution of insane 
persons in Ford v. Wainwright. In the 1988 case of Thompson v. Oklahoma, the 
Court held that the execution of offenders fifteen years of age or younger was 
unconstitutional. Over the past few decades, the population eligible to receive a death 





A. Results of Direct Appeals in Capital Cases from Maryland: 1980 to 200413 





1980 0 1 0 1 
1981 1 1 0 2 
1982 0 2 1 3 
1983 1 2 3 6 
1984 0 1 5 6 
1985 1 1 5 7 
1986 1 2 2 5 
1987 0 1 2 3 
1988 0 3 0 3 
1989 1 0 1 2 
1990 1 0 3 4 
1991 2 1 2 5 
1992 1 2 2 5 
1993 0 0 3 3 
1995 0 0 1 1 
1996 1 0 1 2 
1997 1 2 2 5 
1998 0 0 1 1 
1999 0 0 1 1 
2000 1 0 1 2 
2001 1 0 2 3 
2002 0 0 1 1 
2003 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 1 1 2 
Total 13 20 40 73 
Percent 18% 28% 54% 100% 
Table 2 Part B: Breakdown by Type of Reversal 
Convictions: Number Percent 
Reversed 13 18% 
Affirmed 60 82% 
Total 73 100% 
Sentences:  
Reversed on Procedural Grounds 
 
20 33% 
Reversed on Substantive Grounds 0 0% 
Affirmed 40 67% 
Total 60 100% 
Table 2, part B shows that forty cases were affirmed outright, and in twenty 
cases the death sentence was vacated, with the judgment otherwise affirmed.  In the 
 
13 Appeals from1980-2004 correspond to original convictions from 1979-1999. 
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other thirteen cases presented to the court on direct appeal, the conviction was 
reversed and remanded for a new trial.  Each of these reversals was based on  
procedural errors—with not a single death sentence being reversed on substantive 
grounds in the twenty-four years the Maryland State Supreme Court reviewed these 
death sentences.  As previously stated, the Maryland State Supreme Court has not 
vacated even one single death sentence due to comparative excessiveness.  The post-
Gregg revisions of Maryland’s death penalty statute included a proportionality review 
section which required the Court of Appeals to review each death sentence and 
determine “whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the 
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.”  In 
the fall of 1992, the Maryland State Legislature repealed the proportionality review 
element in subsection § 414(e)(4) of the death penalty statute.  Thus, the Maryland 
State Supreme Court theoretically conducted a proportionality review of each death 
sentence handed down from the fall of 1978 to the fall of 1992.  None of these 
proportionality reviews yielded even one comparatively excessive death sentence.  In 
an effort to understand whether their conclusions were the result of proportionate 
sentences, or simply an ineffective proportionality review, I turn first to the fact-
specific frequency analysis—which most closely resembles the methodology used by 
the Maryland State Supreme Court. 
Results of the Fact-Specific Salient Factors Analysis
The fact-specific salient factor method relies on characteristics of the case 
deemed important in the eyes of the Maryland State Supreme Court.  In order to 
determine which factors were most important, I reviewed the court’s discussion 
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regarding the proportionality of the sentence.  In the event that the opinion lacked a 
proportionality review, a close examination of the rest of the opinion provided insight 
into the factors which the court found most significant.  Once the salient factors of a 
case were identified, any other death eligible cases which were sentenced prior to the 
direct appeal of the case in question were included in the group of similar cases.  
Each case was matched on up to three salient factors, or until the group was narrowed 
down to less than two cases.  After the groups of similar cases were selected, the 
proportion of similar cases receiving a death sentence was calculated.  If, in the group 
of similar cases, the number also receiving a death sentence was high—. 75 or 
above—then the case under review was deemed proportionate.  However, if the 
proportion of similar cases receiving a death sentence was low—less than .35—then 
the case under review was deemed disproportionate.   
 Table 3 provides the results of a proportionality review of Maryland death 
sentences affirmed during the time period in which the Maryland State Supreme 
Court was required to detect and remove disproportionate sentences. 
 
Table 3: 
Proportion of Defendants Receiving a Death Sentence Within  
Subgroups of Comparable Cases Defined by Fact Specific Approach:  
Affirmed Cases Prior to October 1, 1992 Only 
 
A. Cases Analysis Number of Specific Facts Matched in Comparison Group:
Case One Two Three 






Calhoun v. State   2/18 
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Evans v. State (II)  0/1 
(0) 
 

































Grandison v. State (II)   0/1 
(0) 
 






Table 3 B. Summary: Proportion of Death Sentences Within 
Groups of Comparable Cases by Salient Factors: 
Affirmed Cases Prior to October 1, 1992 Only 
 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in This Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death 
Cases 
Less than .35 11/26 42% 
.35 - .50 11/26 42% 
.51 - .75 4/26 15% 
.76 – 1.00 0/26 0% 
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Table 3 Part A does not reveal a death sentence which would not be considered 
disproportionate using a benchmark of .8.14 These cases include Booth v. State (II),15 
Booth v. State (III),16 and Huffington v. State.17 Some of the salient factors these 
cases share include robbing and killing multiple victims in the same incident, killing 
children or minors, or shooting victims execution-style.  For each of these cases, at 
least six out of ten cases with similar characteristics also received a death sentence.  
The seriousness of the salient factors as well as the consistency with which death 
sentences are imposed in these cases support the notion that these death sentences 
were affirmed in a manner consistent with the proportionality review requirement.    
 However, when the rest of the affirmed cases are also considered, the picture 
is a little different.  Table 3 Part B shows that eleven of the twenty-six cases are 
considered disproportionate or comparatively excessive, using the standard of .35 or 
less.  That is to say, less than 35% of similar cases receive death sentences for 42% of 
all affirmed death sentences affirmed prior to 1992.  As the number of similar cases 
with death sentences gets even lower, the comparative excessiveness of the sentence 
becomes even more apparent.   
For example, in Gilliam v. State,18 the defendant kidnapped a female victim 
and took her to a remote location.  He robbed the victim, acquiring approximately 
three dollars.  Then the defendant shot the victim in the face with a sawed off shotgun 
because “she saw his face.”  The victim died as a result of the gunshot wound she 
 
14 A benchmark for proportionate cases of .8 indicates that at least 80% of similar cases also received a 
death sentence.   
15 316 Md. 363; 558 A.2d 1205; 1989. 
16 327 Md. 142; 608 A.2d 162; 1992. 
17 304 Md. 559; 500 A.2d 272; 1985. 
18 320 Md. 637; 579 A.2d 744; 1990 
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sustained to her face.  The crime occurred on December 2, 1988.  The case made its 
way to the Maryland State Supreme Court for direct appeal and was affirmed on 
September 25, 1990.  Since the crime and direct appeal occurred prior to the 
abrogation of the proportionality review element in 1992, the court was legally 
obligated to conduct a proportionality review in this case.  When they considered this 
case on direct appeal, they explained their decision to affirm the death sentence with 
regard to proportionality: 
Our analysis indicates that death penalty sentences have been imposed 
in a significant number of cases where the aggravating circumstances 
involved a murder in the course of a robbery and/or kidnapping. 
Considering both this defendant and the brutal nature of his crime, we 
conclude that the death sentence was neither excessive nor 
disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases. 
 -Gilliam v. State19 on or about p. 53.  
They identify two salient factors: (1) murder in the course of kidnapping and (2) 
murder in the case of robbery.  The first group matched on one salient factor is 
comprised of cases where the defendant murdered their victim in the course of 
kidnapping them.  Prior to the direct appeal in Gilliam, twelve other defendants had 
kidnapped and killed their victim in a death eligible case.  Of these twelve similar 
cases, six also received a death sentence.  Thus, when matched on one salient factor 
(kidnapping), similar cases received a death sentence exactly half of the time.  When 
matched on two salient factors, murder in the course of kidnapping and murder in the 
course of robbery, the group of comparable cases shrinks to three.  Of these three 
similar cases, only one had received a death sentence; therefore, cases matched on 
two salient factors receive a death sentence approximately 33% of the time.   
 
19 Gilliam v. State 320 Md. 637; 579 A.2d 744; 1990 
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Since the court does not specify which of the two salient factors is most 
important, it may be the case that the analysis they conducted, which found that “a 
significant number” of similar cases were also sentenced to death, reversed the order 
of the salient factors thereby changing the results to find a larger proportion of similar 
cases receiving death sentences.  If the initial group of comparison cases was matched 
only on robbery, instead of kidnapping, then perhaps Gilliam’s death sentence would 
be among a significant number of other death sentences, and accordingly 
proportionate.  A count reveals one hundred forty-eight other defendants had 
murdered a victim in the course of a robbery prior to the direct appeal in Gilliam. Of 
the one hundred forty-eight cases, death sentences were handed down twenty-six 
times.  Thus, slightly less than 18% of similar cases matched on robbery were 
sentenced to death.   
Based on the language in Gilliam, the court used one of these three 
combinations to determine that “death penalty sentences have been imposed in a 
significant number of cases where the aggravating circumstances involved a murder 
in the course of a robbery and/or kidnapping.”  Even the best case scenario—
encompassing all cases in which the victim was murdered in the case of kidnapping—
allows for the death penalty to be imposed no more than half of the time.  The other 
two possible combinations effectively classify death sentences as proportionate when 
similar cases receive the death penalty 17% or 33% of the time.  In effect, Gilliam’s 
death sentence was classified as proportionate because similar cases received the 
death penalty 17% of the time, 33% of the time, or at most 50% of the time.  Tyrone 
Delano Gilliam was executed on November 16, 1998.   
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Proportionate sentences after Pulley v. Harris 
In 1984, Pulley held that proportionality review was not “…so critical that 
without it the Georgia statute would not have passed constitutional muster.”20 Eight 
years after Pulley, Maryland repealed the proportionality review component in their 
death penalty statute.  However, this did not mean that Maryland’s sentences after 
1992 were free to be disproportionate and excessive.  Indeed, Pulley simply presented 
states with more discretion in their task of handing down constitutional sentences.  It 
was the opinion of Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens in Gregg that, “…some form 
of meaningful appellate review is still required.”21 The purpose of this review 
remained to serve as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death 
penalty.  In this sense, sentencing free from prejudice and comparative excessiveness 
was still a common objective held by the 8th Amendment, the 14th Amendment, 
Furman, Gregg, and even Pulley. The Pulley court trusted that the states could attain 
this shared goal without the legal requirement of proportionality review.  In this 
sense, all capital cases in Maryland after 1992 should still have been free from 
arbitrary and capricious judgments, ergo not comparatively excessive.  A 
proportionality review can assess the comparative excessiveness of cases after 1992.  
Had the court conducted a proportionality review after 1992, this is what they would 
have found.   
Table 4 provides the results of a proportionality review utilizing the salient 
factor method for affirmed death sentences after October 1, 1992.  In five of the 
thirteen cases, a death sentence was handed down in similar cases 51% - 75% of the 
 
20 Pulley v. Harris on or about p.46 
21 As noted in Pulley v. Harris on or about p.46. 
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time.  In the remaining eight cases affirmed during this time period, less than 35% of 
similar cases received death sentences.  Using the benchmark of .3522 to denote 
comparative excessiveness, eight out of thirteen cases, or 62% of all death sentences 
affirmed after 1992 were classified as comparatively excessive.  These include White 
v. State,23 Ball v. State,24 Conyers v. State,25 Ware v. State,26 Miles v. State,27 Baker v. 
State,28 Oken v. State, 29and Thanos v State (II).30 
22 The benchmark of .35 was employed by Baldus et al. (1983; 1990) in their proportionality review of 
Georgia death sentences and the proportionality review of South Carolina death sentences carried out 
by Paternoster and Kazyaka (1990) to denote disproportionate sentences.   
23 322 Md. 738; 589 A.2d 969; 1991 
24 347 Md. 156; 699 A.2d 1170; 1997 
25 354 Md. 132; 729 A.2d 910; 1999 
26 300 Md. 719; 481 A.2d 201; 1984 
27 365 Md. 488; 781 A.2d 787; 2001 
28 367 Md. 648; 790 A.2d 629; 2002 
29 381 Md. 580; 851 A.2d 538; 2004 




Proportion of Defendants Receiving a Death Sentence Within  
Subgroups of Comparable Cases Defined by Fact Specific Approach:  
Affirmed Cases After October 1, 1992 Only 
 
A. Cases Analysis Number of Specific Facts Matched in Comparison Group:
Case One Two Three 












Perry v. State   2/3 
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Table 4 Part B. Summary: Proportion of Death Sentences Within 
Groups of Comparable Cases by Salient Factors: 
Affirmed Cases Only 
 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in This Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death 
Cases 
Less than .35 8/13 62% 
.36 - .50 0/13 0% 
.51 - .75 5/13 38% 
.76 – 1.00 0/13 0% 
73 
For a more detailed example, consider the case of Baker v. State.31 The 
defendant shot and killed one female victim in a mall parking lot while attempting to 
rob her in front of witnesses who were not also committing the crime.  The salient 
factors in this case are (1) robbery while committing first degree murder, (2) using 
handgun in the commission of a felony, and (3) victim killed in front of witnesses.  
Prior to the direct appeal in this case, 291 other defendants committed robbery in 
addition to first degree murder.  Of these 291 other cases matched on one salient 
factor, a death sentence was handed down in 41 cases.  This means that 
approximately 14% of other cases matching on one salient factor received a death 
sentence.  Taking it a step further, cases are matched on two characteristics: (1) 
robbery while committing first degree murder and (2) use of a handgun in 
commission of a felony.  The number of similar cases matched on these two 
characteristics fall to 135 cases—17 of which also receive a death sentence.  When 
compared to cases sharing these two salient factors, approximately 13% of similar 
cases receive a death sentence.  When the group is narrowed down even further to 
include the third salient factor—victim killed in front of witnesses—the number of 
similar cases drops to 60.  Of this group of similar cases matched on these three 
salient factors, 7 received a death sentence.  After comparing Baker to other cases 
which share three salient factors, a death sentence was imposed in only 12% of the 
similar cases.  When only twelve out of one hundred similar cases would receive a 
death sentence, that death sentence would be considered comparatively excessive by 
common standards.  Wesley Eugene Baker was executed on December 5, 2005.   
 
31 367 Md. 648; 790 A.2d 629; 2002 
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 The proportionality reviews conducted by the court routinely excluded many 
cases which shared the factor(s) they determined to be most salient in the case under 
review.  For example, in the 1981 case of White v. State32 the facts of the case state 
that two defendants were driving around looking for someone to rob.  Defendant 
White spotted a man on a moped and followed him.  They attempted to get the driver 
of the moped to pull over, but that failed.  When Defendant White saw that the moped 
was not pulling over, he shot the driver once and killed him.  The defendants fled the 
scene, leaving the moped and victim on the side of the road.  The case made its way 
to the Maryland State Supreme Court on direct appeal in 1984.  The court’s review of 
the case included a proportionality review section in which they note the following: 
There seems to be no other case in the inventory in which the killer by 
pure chance passed by the victim on a public street in broad daylight, 
decided that the victim had some property which the killer coveted and 
then, without warning, demand, or resistance by the victim, simply 
killed the victim in cold blood. 
 -White v. State on or about p.33 
The facts of the case as well as the description provided by the court above 
reasonably permit the case to include the following salient factors: (1) murder in the 
course of robbery, (2) offender and victim were strangers who had not previously 
been acquainted, and (3) use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.  If the case 
under review was matched with the three salient factors listed above, the group 
holding the first salient factor in common would consist of seventy-three cases, 
fifteen of which received death sentences.  If the group of similar cases shares the 
first and second salient factor listed above, then forty-seven cases would share this 
 
32 300 Md. 719; 481 A.2d 201; 1984 
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commonality, ten of which received death sentences.  If all three salient factors were 
matched, then twenty-five similar cases remain for comparison.  Six of these twenty-
five received a death sentence.   
The court notes several other small details which make this case unique—the 
incident took place on a public street in broad daylight, and the crime occurred 
“without warning, demand or resistance by the victim.”  It is always possible to 
include so many small details so as to make any homicide completely unique, thereby 
creating a deficiency of comparable cases.  Previous proportionality reviews 
conducted by the court show that they were frequently very general in their 
description of the case under review, simplifying the process of selecting comparable 
cases.33 In the proportionality reviews where the case description is very specific and 
the accompanying list of salient factors sparse, many suitable comparison cases are 
overlooked.  If the court in White had classified the case in more general terms, there 
would have been ample comparison cases available to make the determination of 
proportionality—instead of declaring that this case was alone in the inventory.  
Furthermore, had the court characterized the case as a robbery-homicide in which 
there was no relationship between the victim and offender and a handgun was used in 
the commission of this felony, they may have also found that less than one quarter of 
all comparison cases received a death sentence. 
This subjectivity allows inconsistent standards, producing inconsistent results.  
This is a major flaw in the fact-specific salient factor method.  This method most 
closely resembles the proportionality review methodology of the Maryland State 
 
33 In the example case of Gilliam v State the court described the case as “the aggravating circumstances 
involved a murder in the course of a robbery and/or kidnapping.”  Using (1) robbery and (2) 
kidnapping as salient factors provides a plethora of cases from which to select a comparison group. 
76 
Supreme Court.  Previous researchers have offered the overall aggravation propensity 
score method as an alternative way of measuring comparative excessiveness among 
death sentences and a way to check the reliability of the salient factor method. 
Results of the Overall Aggravation Propensity Score Analysis
The overall aggravation propensity score method estimates the conditional 
probability of a defendant being sentenced to death based on significant independent 
variables assigned a weight based on their predictive importance.  The independent 
variables are estimated in a logistic regression equation with the sentence—death or 
less than death—as the outcome variable.  There are nine independent variables used 
in this equation to best explain whether or not the defendant received a death 
sentence.  The variables are: 
1. The defendant expressed pleasure for the killing 
2. Multiple victims were killed. 
3. There was evidence that the defendant had an adult criminal record. 
4. The defendant is alleged to have committed additional crimes in the time 
period immediately before or after the homicide. 
5. The victim suffered multiple trauma (shot and stabbed, stabbed and choked) 
6. The victim and offender were not acquainted prior to the homicide, they were 
strangers. 
7. Total number of aggravating circumstances. 
8. The defendant maintains his/her innocence. 
9. The crime occurred in the home of the victim or the home of the victim’s 
family. 
10. Race of victim.34 
11. Race of offender.35 
12. The crime occurred in Baltimore County.36 
34 The race variable is initially included in the estimation of the equation, and taken out before the 
propensity scores are calculated.  It is initially included to “purge the non-race variables of any effect 
racial bias might have…” (Paternoster and Kazyaka, 1990). 
35 Ibid. 
36 Previous research has shown that a capital crime in Baltimore County significantly increases the 




Logistic Regression for the Decision to Sentence Convicted Capital Defendants to 
Death (N=1,311) 
Variable: Logit Coefficient Odds Multiplier 
The defendant expressed pleasure for the killing 2.432 11.376* 
Multiple victims were killed. .192 1.211* 
There was evidence that the defendant had an adult 
criminal record. 
.208 1.232* 
The defendant is alleged to have committed 
additional crimes in the time period immediately 
before or after the homicide. 
.680 1.973* 
The victim suffered multiple trauma (shot and 
stabbed, stabbed and choked) 
-0.94 .911 
The victim and offender were not acquainted prior to 
the homicide, they were strangers. 
.227 1.255 
Total number of aggravating circumstances. 1.021 2.776* 
The defendant maintains his/her innocence. .321 1.378 
The crime occurred in the home of the victim or the 
home of the victim’s family. 
.277 1.319 
Race of victim. 1.754 5.776* 
Race of offender. -.849 .428* 
Crime occurred in Baltimore County, Maryland. 1.880 6.555* 
Constant -6.421 .002 
-2LogLikelihood 400.842  
Degrees of Freedom 20  









Sentence less than 
death 
 




62 14 76 
1181 25 1206 
Percent correctly predicted by the model:  99.0% 
Percent correctly predicted by chance:  18.4% 
Percent reduction in error relative to chance: 93.9% 
After trying several equations, this was the most parsimonious model.  The 
analysis reveals twelve independent factors that influence whether or not a defendant 
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was sentenced to death.  These factors are: (1) The defendant expressed pleasure for 
the killing; (2) Multiple victims were killed; (3) There was evidence that the 
defendant had an adult criminal record; (4) The defendant is alleged to have 
committed additional crimes in the time period immediately before or after the 
homicide; (5) The victim suffered multiple trauma (shot and stabbed, stabbed and 
choked); (6) The victim and offender were not acquainted prior to the homicide, they 
were strangers; (7) Total number of aggravating circumstances; (8) The defendant 
maintains his/her innocence; (9) The crime occurred in the home of the victim or the 
home of the victim’s family. 
The odds multiplier is listed in the right-hand column in Table 5.  The odds 
multiplier corresponds to the odds ratio for a unit increase in the explanatory variable.  
According to Table 5, the odds multiplier for the “defendant expressed pleasure for 
the killing” variable is 11.376.  In other words, the odds of receiving a death sentence 
are increased by a factor of 11.376 in cases where the defendant expressed pleasure 
for the killing.   
 Using the logit model estimated above, a propensity score was calculated for 
each case by summing the value of the logistic coefficients and the constant for each 
factor present.  This propensity score represents the likelihood of a death sentence in 
each specific case.  In theory, the higher the propensity score, the greater the 
seriousness of the case, and the more likely it is that a case receives a death sentence.  
To test this, comparable cases were matched on the basis of their propensity score to 
determine whether they received similar sentences to the case under review.  Table 7 
provides the results of the propensity score method, where groups are created by 
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comparing the fifteen cases above and fifteen cases below the case under review 
when cases are ranked by propensity score (predicted probability based on the logit 
model).  When similar cases were grouped by propensity score, sensitivity tests 
demonstrated that findings were consistent when arranging similar cases by equal 
groups of different sizes.  See Appendix B for additional analyses using the five 
groups above and five groups below the case under review. 
The propensity score analysis reveals thirty-three comparatively excessive 
death sentences have been affirmed by the Maryland State Supreme Court.  The list 
of these disproportionate cases is denoted by an asterisk in Table 7 Part A and 
includes: Perry v. State,37 Hunt v State,38 Jones v. State,39 Calhoun v. State,40 Colvin 
(I) v. State,41 Harris v. State,42 Baker v. State,43 Booth (II) v. State,44 Collins v. State,45 
Foster v. State,46 Booth (I) v. State,47 Booth (III) v. State,48 Bowers v. State,49 Miles v. 
State,50 Ware v. State,51 Henry v. State,52 Stebbing v. State,53 Conyers v. State,54 
Gilliam v. State,55 Huffington v. State,56 White v. State,57 Mills v. State,58 Evans (I) v. 
 
37 344 Md. 204; 686 A.2d 274; 1996 
38 312 Md. 494; 540 A.2d 1125; 1988 
39 310 Md. 569; 530 A.2d 743; 1987 
40 297 Md. 563; 468 A.2d 45; 1983 
41 299 Md. 88; 472 A.2d 953; 1984 
42 303 Md. 685; 496 A.2d 1074; 1985 
43 367 Md. 648; 790 A.2d 629; 2002 
44 316 Md. 363; 558 A.2d 1205; 1989 
45 Ibid. 
46 304 Md. 439; 499 A.2d 1236; 1985 
47 306 Md. 172; 507 A.2d 1098; 1986 
48 327 Md. 142; 608 A.2d 162; 1992 
49 298 Md. 115; 468 A.2d 101; 1983 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid. 
52 324 Md. 204; 596 A.2d 1024; 1991 
53 299 Md. 331; 473 A.2d 903; 1984 
54 354 Md. 132; 729 A.2d 910; 1999 
55 Ibid. 
56 304 Md. 559; 500 A.2d 272; 1985 
57 Ibid. 
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State,59 Ball v. State,60 Evans (II) v. State,61 Grandison (I) v. State,62 Grandison (II) v. 
State,63 Clermont v. State,64 Burch v. State,65 Colvin (II) v. State,66 Oken v. State,67 
Wiggins v. State,68 and Borchardt v. State.69 
58 310 Md. 33; 527 A.2d 3; 1987 
59 301 Md. 45; 481 A.2d 1135; 1984 
60 Ibid. 
61 304 Md. 487; 499 A.2d 1261; 1985 
62 305 Md. 685; 506 A.2d 580; 1986 
63 341 Md. 175; 670 A.2d 398; 1995 
64 348 Md. 419; 704 A.2d 880; 1998 
65 346 Md. 253; 696 A.2d 443; 1997 
66 332 Md. 144; 630 A.2d 725; 1993 
67 Ibid. 
68 324 Md. 551; 597 A.2d 1359; 1991 
69 367 Md. 91; 786 A.2d 631; 2001 
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Table7: Proportion of Affirmed Death Sentences for Defendants  
Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases Where  
Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score 
 
Case Propensity Score 
Perry v. State 10/30 (.33)* 
Hunt v. State 3/30 (.10)* 
Jones v. State 4/30 (.13)* 
Calhoun v. State 7/30  (.23)* 
Colvin v. State 5/30  (.17)* 
Harris v. State 2/30  (.06)* 
Tichnell v. State (III) 7/15  (.47) 
Baker v. State 1/30  (.03)* 
Booth v. State (II b) 3/30  (.10)* 
Collins v. State 1/30  (.03)* 
Foster v. State 0/30  (0)* 
Booth v. State (II a) 1/30  (.03)* 
Booth v. State (II c) 2/30  (.06)* 
Bowers v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
Miles v. State 2/30  (.06)* 
Ware v. State 1/30  (.03)* 
Henry v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
Stebbing v. State 0/30  (0)* 
Conyers v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
Johnson (L.) v. State 12/25  (.48) 
Gilliam v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
Huffington v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
White v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
Mills v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
Trimble v. State 14/30  (.47) 
Evans v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
Thanos v. State 10/21 (.48) 
Ball v. State 1/30  (.03)* 
Evans v. State 5/30  (.17)* 
Grandison v. State 5/30  (.17)* 
Grandison v. State 4/30  (.13)* 
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Bruce v. State 12/23  (.52) 
Colvin v. State 5/30 (.17)* 
Clermont v. State 4/30 (.13)* 
Burch v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
Oken v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
Thanos v. State 10/21  (.48) 
Wiggins v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
Borchardt v. State 6/30  (.20)* 
*denotes cases in which less than 35% of similar cases received a death sentence 
Table 7: Part B 
Summary: Proportion of Affirmed Death Sentences for Defendants  
Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases Where  
Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score 
 
Probability of Death Sentence for 
Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death Cases 
in This Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death Cases 
Less than .35 33/39 84.5% 
.35 - .50 5/39 12.5% 
.51 - .75 1/39 3% 
.76 – 1.00 0/39 0% 
Table 7 Part B summarizes the overall findings of this method; 33/39 cases, 
roughly 85% of all death sentences affirmed by the Maryland State Supreme Court 
from 1980-2004 were comparatively excessive.  The probability of receiving a death 
sentence in cases similar to the remaining six affirmed death sentences ranged from 
.47 - .52.  In sum, each time the Maryland State Supreme Court affirmed a death 
sentence, no more than 52% of similar cases had also received the death penalty.  
Consistently Disproportionate Death Sentences 
A comparison of the results from the salient factors method and the propensity 
score method reveal eleven affirmed death sentences which are consistently 
disproportionate regardless of the method of analysis.  The consistently 
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disproportionate cases affirmed prior to October 1, 1992 include: Calhoun v. State, 
Harris v. State, Collins v. State, Foster v. State, Bowers v. State, Gilliam v. State, 
Mills v. State,  Evans (II) v. State,  Grandison (II) v. State,  Clermont v. State, and 
Colvin v. State. 
After the proportionality review element had been repealed, seven cases were 
affirmed that are regarded as disproportionate given the low number of similar cases 
also receiving a death sentences.  These cases include: Baker v. State, Miles v. State, 
Ware v. State, Conyers v. State, White v. State, Ball v. State, and Oken v. State. 
Commonalities Among Disproportionate Cases 
Given that eighteen disproportionate death sentences in total have been 
affirmed since 1978, it is important to recognize any common factors these cases 
share.  Previous research has suggested that death sentences are more likely to be 
handed down in cases where the victim is white and the offender is black and in 
homicides committed in Baltimore County, Maryland (Paternoster et al., 2004).  A 
cursory check reveals that in nine of the eighteen disproportionate cases, the victim 
was white and the offender was black, consistent with the research.  In comparison, 
20.7% of all death eligible cases fit the same criteria where the victim was white and 
the offender was black. Furthermore, nine of the eighteen disproportionate cases 
originate from Baltimore County.  This is also much higher than the 11.6% of all 
death eligible that fell into this geographical category.  This gross imbalance is a 
particularly disturbing trend because both race and geography are extralegal factors 
which should bear no weight on the sentencing process. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
This project assessed the proportionality review practices of the Maryland 
State Supreme Court from 1979-1992, during which time a proportionality review 
was legally required for each death sentence presented to the court on direct appeal.  
This project also examined the proportionality of death sentences affirmed after 
October 1, 1992—the point when the court was no longer required to assess the 
comparative excessiveness of death sentences.  A reproduction of the method closely 
resembling the proportionality review conducted by the court revealed a considerable 
number of inconsistencies in the court’s methods and conclusions.  The court often 
failed to consider several relevant cases when selecting cases for a comparison group.  
Had they included all the relevant cases in their review of comparison cases, they 
likely would have vacated eleven death sentences, judgment otherwise affirmed on 
the grounds that the sentence was comparatively excessive.   Instead, the court found 
no disproportionate sentences, often concluding instead that there were a “significant 
number of similar cases also sentenced to death.”  A thorough review would have 
revealed that this number was far lower than expected.  An analysis of death 
sentences after October 1, 1992 showed no change in the court’s practice of 
consistently affirming comparatively excessive death sentences.   
The propensity score analysis, a more empirical method of proportionality 
review offered support for the general conclusions of the salient factor method.  The 
propensity score method relied on a logistic regression analysis and offered an 
alternative way to assess proportionality.  The propensity score method also 
concluded that several sentences were comparatively excessive.  Analyses from both 
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methods revealed eleven common cases in which comparatively excessive death 
sentences affirmed from 1978 – 1992.  The agreement among the two methods 
supports the notion that the Maryland State Supreme Court did not detect and 
eliminate disproportionate death sentences as they were legally required to do.   
The Gregg Court stated the purpose of proportionality reviews, noting the 
procedure “compares each death sentence with the sentences imposed on similar 
situated defendants to ensure that the sentence of death in a particular case is not 
disproportionate.”70 The importance of the proportionality review was emphasized 
by the court:  “On their face these procedures seem to satisfy the concerns of Furman.
No longer should there be ‘no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it is not.’”71 
The strong presence of racial and geographical factors shared by the 
disproportionate sentences identified above brings us alarmingly close to the 
problems highlighted in Furman. Indeed, Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion in 
Furman addressed this matter: 
My concurring Brothers have demonstrated that, if any basis can be 
discerned for the selection of these few to be sentenced to die, it is the 
constitutionally impermissible basis of race… But racial 
discrimination has not been proved, and I put it to one side. I simply 
conclude that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate 
the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit 
this unique penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed. 
 -Furman v. Georgia, on or about p. 310 
Over three decades ago the Furman court clearly stated that the death penalty 
was not to be imposed “so wantonly and so freakishly” and that race-based death 
 
70 Gregg v. Georgia on or about p. 198 or p. 199.
71 Ibid. 
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sentences were “constitutionally impermissible.”  In 1976, the Gregg court evaluated 
the states’ legislative response to Furman and approved the revised statutes, 
presuming the newly incorporated guidelines would eliminate arbitrary death 
sentences.  Eight years later the Pulley court clarified their words in Gregg and stated 
that constitutional capital statutes need not be an exact replica of the originally 
approved Georgia statute.  For a capital statute to pass constitutional muster, it simply 
needed some form of safeguard to ensure that death sentences were imposed in an 
evenhanded manner.  The court gave the states freedom to choose which measures to 
include in their capital statutes.     
It is with this discretion that Maryland decided to include a provision for 
proportionality review until 1992, at which time they chose to repeal it.  Presumably, 
Maryland believed that their capital statute sans proportionality review would be 
sufficient in preventing arbitrary and capricious death sentences.  However, data from 
1978 – 1992 establish that the initial post-Gregg capital statute did not identify and 
eliminate disproportionate or arbitrary death sentences as it was intended to do.  
Additional analysis of data from 1992 - 1999 shows that disproportionate capital 
sentencing continued for the seven years after the proportionality review element was 
repealed.72 Figure 2 illustrates the consistent pattern of death sentences affirmed on 
direct appeal from 1979 – 1999.  In the thirteen years preceding the abrogation of the 
proportionality review element, the court failed to vacate eight disproportionate death 
sentences on direct appeal.  For the seven years after proportionality reviews were no 
 
72 Data for the years after 1999 was not available so no conclusions were made for death sentences 
affirmed after 1999. 
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longer required in Maryland, three disproportionate death sentences were affirmed on 
direct appeal.   






















































Since the strongest commonalities held by affirmed death sentences in 
Maryland are extralegal factors instead of the legally permissible aggravators and 
mitigators, it is clear that the guidelines called for in Gregg were not effective in 
eliminating arbitrary and capricious death sentences.   Indeed, Maryland never 
stopped handing down disproportionate death sentences—not during the time they 
conducted proportionality reviews, and certainly not after 1992 when they were no 
longer required to do one. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
The states still have the discretion to select necessary safeguards to prevent 
arbitrary capital sentencing.  The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments remain in tact, 
and it is still the responsibility of the states to ensure that death sentences are imposed 
in a fair and equitable manner.  The results of this proportionality review identified 
eleven death sentences affirmed on direct appeal that were comparatively excessive.  
This is evidence that Maryland’s attempt to remedy the issues highlighted in Furman 
and eliminate the arbitrary nature of capital sentencing failed miserably.   
It is time for Maryland to take responsibility for the derisory nature of its 
capital statute.  New guidelines need to be established to effectively uphold the 
standards set forth 30 years ago in Gregg. The first step is to put precautionary 
measures in place to identify and eliminate disproportionate death sentences, thereby 
reducing the arbitrary nature of capital sentencing.   
As demonstrated in this paper, one such safeguard is an effective 
proportionality review.  In order for a proportionality review to be effective, it must 
be systematic and empirically based.  No longer can the court subjectively choose 
cases to satisfy a proportionate conclusion.  An objective, empirically based approach 
leads to objective and consistent conclusions—offering a better chance to eliminate 
capricious and arbitrary death sentences.  The propensity score method utilized in this 
project is fully capable of identifying and eliminating disproportionate death 
sentences.  Regardless of the method used in the proportionality review, the universe 
of comparable cases must include every case which was eligible for a death sentence 
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based on the legal elements of the crime.  A broader picture allows for greater 
certainly in assessing the proportionality of a death sentence. 
The second step is to evaluate the proportionality of each death sentence 
already affirmed on direct appeal.  If any death sentences are found to be 
comparatively excessive, the sentence should be vacated for new sentencing—not 
because a proportionality review is legally required, but because a disproportionate 
death sentence is still arbitrary and capricious, and in violation of the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
This look at capital sentencing in Maryland for the two decades following 
Gregg exposed the court’s failed attempts to ensure fairness in capital sentencing.  By 
the court’s own standards, the death penalty was not reserved for the most serious 
murderers.  It is time to resurrect safeguards such as the proportionality review to 
ensure that the only death sentences affirmed on direct appeal in Maryland are truly 
“the worst of the worst.” 
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Appendix A: Case Characteristics for Maryland Death sentences: 1979-1999
Case Decision Date of Decisionyyymmdd Case Description
Tichnell v. State






Defendants broke into a store early in the morning to steal some handguns. A silent
alarm notified the police and a Sheriff's Deputy went to investigate. In an attempt
to flee from the police, Defendant Tichnell shot and killed the Sheriff's Deputy
execution-style before steeling the deputy's police cruiser.
Tichnell v. State






Defendants broke into a store early in the morning to steal some handguns. A silent
alarm notified the police and a Sheriff's Deputy went to investigate. In an attempt
to flee from the police, Defendant Tichnell shot and killed the Sheriff's Deputy
execution-style before steeling the deputy's police cruiser.
Poole v. State
290 Md. 114; 428
A.2d 434; 1981
remanded for new trial 19810421 Defendant robbed store and shot and killed store owner with a shotgun.
Johnson v. State
292 Md. 405; 439
A.2d 542; 1982
remanded to Circuit Court of
Calvert County for new
sentencing
19820107
Defendants kidnapped female victim and drove around in a car with her smoking
parsley flakes sprayed with some kind of embalming fluid. They drove the victim
to a remote location where two of the defendants (including Johnson) raped the
victim in the backseat of the car. The defendants robbed the victim of her
belongings. Johnson then shot and killed the victim so she could not report the
crime and identify the defendants.
Thomas v. State
294 Md. 625; 451
A.2d 929; 198
remanded for new sentencing 19821110
Defendant Thomas was convicted of felony murder and sentenced to death. A
review of the sentence and an appeal were before the Court of Appeals. After the
matter was argued before the Court but before disposition, the Court was advised of
Thomas' death.
Huffington v. State
295 Md. 1; 452 A.2d
1211
Affirmed 19821206
The defendant murdered a male victim by shooting him five times in the back and
head before stealing drugs off the body of the dead victim. The defendant then went
to the first victim's mobile home and there murdered a female victim by striking her
with a bottle and then stabbing her thirty-three times. He took money and drugs
from the home before fleeing.
Poole v. State
295 Md. 167; 453
A.2d 1218; 1983
remanded; death sentence
vacated, judgments as to the
murder and robbery





297 Md. 191; 464
A.2d 986; 1983
remanded for new trial 19830607
Defendant and Defendant's daughter had been drinking when the Defendant said
she wanted to rob a woman. The Defendant said she wanted to rob and kill the
manager of the motel the Defendant lived in. The defendant and her daughter lured
the manager into an vacant motel room and then the Defendant stabbed the victim
with a screwdriver until she died. The Defendant, her daughter, and her husband
took valuables from the victim's motel room and then disposed of the body.
Scott v. State 310




Defendant robbed a McDonalds restaurant. During the robbery, the defendant shot
and killed one male victim, the cashier at the restaurant. Victim was killed in front
of witness (who was not a defendant).
Tichnell v. State
297 Md. 432; 468
A.2d 1; 1983
affirmed; death sentence
vacated on later appeals 19831103
Defendants broke into a store early in the morning to steal some handguns. A silent
alarm notified the police and a Sheriff's Deputy went to investigate. In an attempt
to flee from the police, Defendant Tichnell shot and killed the Sheriff's Deputy
execution-style before steeling the deputy's police cruiser.
Calhoun v. State
297 Md. 563; 468
A.2d 45; 1983
affirmed; later resentenced to
penalty less than death 19831121
Defendant broke into a store while it was closed for the purposes of stealing items
of value. When a store employee, a representative from the alarm company, and an
off-duty police officer responded to the break-in, the defendant shot and killed the
off-duty police officer and the alarm company representative. The defendant shot
and wounded the store employee.
Bowers v. State
298 Md. 115; 468
A.2d 101; 1983
affirmed; then later remanded 19831209 Defendant kidnapped, raped, sodomized, and strangled one female victim. He tookher money and credit cards before fleeing.
Colvin v. State
299 Md. 88; 472
A.2d 953; 1984
affirmed - later commuted to
LIP 19840316
Defendant broke into the home with the intent to rob it. Upon encountering the
homeowner's 82 year-old mother who was visiting from Florida, the defendant
stabbed her twenty-eight times. The victim died as a result of the stab wounds.
Before leaving the home, the defendant stole jewelry and other personal items.
Evans v. State
301 Md. 45; 481
A.2d 1135; 1984
Death 19840404
Defendant Grandison was facing drug charges in an upcoming trial, and wanted
two of the witnesses against him killed. Defendant Grandison promised to pay
Defendant Evans the sum of $9,000 for murdering the two witnesses. Defendant
Evans went to the victims' place of employment and shot and killed two people
with a MAC-11 machine pistol. However, Defendant Evans shot one of the
intended targets, but made a mistake and killed the sister of the second intended
victim instead of the person he was actually being paid to kill.
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Stebbing v. State
299 Md. 331; 473
A.2d 903; 1984
affirmed - modified to LIP by
trial judge 19840416
Defendant and her husband took a 19 year-old female victim to a remote location
and the defendant held the victim down while her husband raped and sexually
assaulted her. While her husband was raping the victim, the defendant strangled
the victim. After the victim was dead, the defendant and her husband took some of
her personal belongings and dumped the body.
Trimble v. State
300 Md. 387; 478
A.2d 1143; 1984
affirmed- later resentenced to
life 19840807
Defendants had been drinking and doing drugs. Defendant Trimble held a female
victim hostage in a van and forcibly raped and sexually assaulted her. Trimble hit
her head and body with a baseball bat and slit her throat. Victim died from blunt
trauma to the head.
White v. State
300 Md. 719; 481
A.2d 201; 1984
affirmed – later resentenced to
LIP on the third resentencing. 19840913
Defendants needed money so Defendant White took his father's revolver and went
with his friend to find someplace to rob. While driving around they spotted a man
on a moped. Defendant White wanted to take the moped so they followed the
moped and tried to get the driver of the moped to pull over. When Defendant
White saw that the moped was not pulling over, he shot the driver once and killed
him. The defendants fled the scene, leaving the moped and victim on the side of
the road.
Maziarz v. State
302 Md. 1; 485 A.2d
245; 1984
remanded for new sentencing 19841221
Defendants raped the female victim in her apartment and tied her hands and legs.
Then the defendants stole her television and some other personal items and lit the
apartment on fire, burning the victim to death.
Lodowski v. State
302 Md. 691; 490
A.2d 1228; 1985
remanded for new trial 19850423
Defendants robbed the manager of a Mini-Mart as he left his store to make a bank
deposit. The defendant (Lodowski) shot and killed the manager as well as an off-
duty police officer who worked as the Mini-Mart security guard.
Johnson v. State
303 Md. 487; 495
A.2d 1; 1985
death; resentenced to life. 19850717
Defendants broke into a house in search of money to steal. They encountered 78
year-old female who lived in the house. The defendants grabbed the woman and
demanded she give them money. She gave them all the money in her billfold ($10).
A search of the house revealed more money. Since the defendants thought she had
been uncooperative by not giving them all the money immediately, and since they
didn't want any witnesses to the crime, they decided to kill the woman. First they
made the victim lie down and jumped on her chest to try to cause a heart attack.
When that did not kill her, they tried to beat her to death with a broom. When that
didn't work, they found some men's ties in the closet and strangled the victim to
death.
Harris v. State
303 Md. 685; 496
A.2d 1074; 1985
affirmed; later death sentence
vacated and case remanded for
new sentencing
19850909
Defendants robbed a sporting goods store and Defendant Harris shot the sole
employee six times. The victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds. On the
way out of the store, the defendants ran into a customer and robbed him too.
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Evans v. State
304 Md. 487; 499
A.2d 1261; 1985
Death 19851112
Defendant Grandison was facing drug charges in an upcoming trial, and wanted
two of the witnesses against him killed. Defendant Grandison promised to pay
Defendant Evans the sum of $9,000 for murdering the two witnesses. Defendant
Evans went to the victims' place of employment and shot and killed two people
with a MAC-11 machine pistol. However, Defendant Evans shot one of the
intended targets, but made a mistake and killed the sister of the second intended
victim instead of the person he was actually being paid to kill.
Foster v. State
304 Md. 439; 499
A.2d 1236; 1985
affirmed - sentence later
reduced to LWOP by governor 19851112
Defendant and Defendant's daughter had been drinking when the Defendant said
she wanted to rob a woman. The Defendant said she wanted to rob and kill the
manager of the motel the Defendant lived in. The defendant and her daughter lured
the manager into an vacant motel room and then the Defendant stabbed the victim
with a screwdriver until she died. The Defendant, her daughter, and her husband
took valuables from the victim's motel room and then disposed of the body.
Huffington v. State
304 Md. 559; 500
A.2d 272; 1985
affirmed; state withdrew death
notice at retrial, and a life
sentence was imposed.
19851113
The defendant murdered a male victim by shooting him five times in the back and
head before stealing drugs off the body of the dead victim. The defendant then went
to the first victim's mobile home and there murdered a female victim by striking her
with a bottle and then stabbing her thirty-three times. He took money and drugs
from the home before fleeing.
Reid v. State




Defendants robbed and stabbed an elderly couple to death in their home. The
defendants were trying to get money to buy heroin. Defendant Reid was the
principal for one of the murders.
Grandison v. State
305 Md. 685; 506
A.2d 580; 1986
death 19860401
Defendant Grandison was facing drug charges in an upcoming trial, and wanted
two of the witnesses against him killed. Defendant Grandison promised to pay
Defendant Evans the sum of $9,000 for murdering the two witnesses. Defendant
Evans went to the victims' place of employment and shot and killed two people
with a MAC-11 machine pistol. However, Defendant Evans shot one of the
intended targets, but made a mistake and killed the sister of the second intended
victim instead of the person he was actually being paid to kill.
Booth v. State
306 Md. 172; 507
A.2d 1098; 1986
death 19860507 Defendants robbed and murdered an elderly couple in their home. The defendantswere trying to get money to buy heroin.
Bowers v. State 306
Md. 120; 507 A.2d
1072; 1986
remanded for new sentencing 19860507 Defendant kidnapped, raped, sodomized, and strangled one female victim. He tookher money and credit cards before fleeing.
Harris v. State 306




Defendants robbed a sporting goods store and Defendant Harris shot the sole
employee six times. The victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds. On the
way out of the store, the defendants ran into a customer and robbed him too.
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Bloodworth v. State
307 Md. 164; 512
A.2d 1056; 1986
remanded to Circuit Court of
Baltimore County for new
trial; 1993: innocence proven
by DNA testing, pardoned by
Governor Shaeffer.
19860729 Defendant sexually assaulted, raped, and killed a 9 year-old girl in the woods. Hekilled her by hitting her head with a rock.
Mills v. State
310 Md. 33; 527
A.2d 3; 1987
affirmed; later remanded,
death sentence vacated by the
U.S. Supreme Court
19870725
Defendant was incarcerated at the Maryland Correctional Institution in Hagerstown,
Maryland. During the night, the defendant stabbed his cellmate 39 times in the
back and 6 times in the chest with a "shank," or homemade knife.
Scott v. State




Defendant robbed a McDonalds restaurant. During the robbery, the defendant shot
and killed one male victim, the cashier at the restaurant.
Jones v. State 310
Md. 569; 530 A.2d
743; 1987
affirmed; death sentence
vacated on later appeals 19870916
Defendants robbed a house and Defendant Jones shot three of the occupants, some
execution-style. One of the three occupants did not die and was only wounded.
When she got up and attempted to leave the house to find help, the defendant
(Jones) saw her and shot her again. She still did not die and eventually made it out
of the house and found help.
Hunt v. State




The defendant was being pursued by a police officer down an alley when the
defendant pulled a .357 Magnum and shot the officer twice at close range. The
officer died as a result of these injuries.
Harris v. State
312 Md. 225; 539
A.2d 637; 1988
remanded - death sentence
vacated 19880405
Defendants robbed a sporting goods store and Defendant Harris shot the sole
employee six times. The victim died as a result of the gunshot wounds. On the
way out of the store, the defendants ran into a customer and robbed him too.
Doering v. State






Defendants broke into victim's home to rob and kill the 89 year-old male victim.
Upon finding the home owner, they shot and killed him with a rifle and then took
valuables and other personal items from the man's home.
Booth v. State
316 Md. 363; 558
A.2d 1205; 1989
Death 19890615
Defendants robbed and stabbed an elderly couple to death in their home. The
defendants were trying to get money to buy heroin. Defendant Booth was the
principal for one of the murders.
Bedford v. State
317 Md. 659; 566
A.2d 111; 1989
remanded to Circuit Court of
Baltimore County for new trial 19891129
Defendant sexually abused, raped, and murdered a woman in her own home. The
defendant then ransacked the house, stole personal items, and stole the victim's car.
Collins v. State
318 Md. 269; 568
A.2d 1; 1990
affirmed; later resentenced to
LIP 19900110
Defendant robbed the victim of $80 out on the street. During the course of the




318 Md. 706; 569
A.2d 1254; 1990
remanded for new trial 19900207
Defendants knew the victims were in the drug business and believed there was a
suitcase full of money in the victim's apartment. The defendants went to the
apartment of one of the victims with the intent to rob and kill several of the
occupants. Defendants entered the apartment and shot and killed five of the six
occupants. The sixth occupant was shot in the head twice, but was still alive. She
pretended to be dead until the defendants were gone, then she went to a neighbor's
apartment for help.
Gilliam v. State
320 Md. 637; 579
A.2d 744; 1990 Md.
death and executed 19900925
Defendants kidnapped woman and took her to a remote location where Defendant
Gilliam robbed her, obtaining a total of $3.00. Then he shot her in the face with a
sawed off shotgun because "she saw his face."
Hunt v. State
321 Md. 387; 583
A.2d 218; 1990
affirmed and executed 19901229
The defendant was being persued by a police officer down an alley when the
defendant pulled a .357 Magnum and shot the officer twice at close range. The
officer died as a result of these injuries.
White v. State




Defendants needed money so Defendant White took his father's revolver and went
with his friend to find someplace to rob. While driving around they spotted a man
on a moped. Defendant White wanted to take the moped so they followed the
moped and tried to get the driver of the moped to pull over. When Defendant
White saw that the moped was not pulling over, he shot the driver once and killed
him. The defendants fled the scene, leaving the moped and victim on the side of
the road.
Bowie v. State
324 Md. 1; 595 A.2d
448; 1991
remanded for new trial 19910911 Defendants robbed a restaurant. During the robbery defendants shot two employeesin the back of the head and one off-duty police officer in the face.
Henry v. State
324 Md. 204; 596
A.2d 1024; 1991
affirmed - sentence later
vacated and resentenced to
time served, and released.
19911011
Defendants knew the victims were in the drug business and believed there was a
suitcase full of money in the victim's apartment. The defendants went to the
apartment of one of the victims with the intent to rob and kill several of the
occupants. Defendants entered the apartment and shot and killed five of the six
occupants. The sixth occupant was shot in the head twice, but was still alive. She
pretended to be dead until the defendants were gone, then she went to a neighbor's
apartment for help.
Wiggins v. State
324 Md. 551; 597
A.2d 1359; 1991
affirmed; resentenced to LIP 19911108 Defendant drowned elderly victim in her bathtub, then took some of her valuablesand her car, and left.
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Richardson v. State
324 Md. 611; 598
A.2d 180; 1991
remanded for new trial 19911112
Defendant broke into an apartment inhabited by a couple and their infant daughter.
The defendant shot the adult male victim four times, and then repeatedly raped the
adult female victim. The defendant took valuables from the woman's purse and left




remanded for new sentencing 19920109
Defendant killed a male victim and a female victim and then held another female
victim at knifepoint while he robbed, raped and sexually assaulted her. The second
female victim lived.
Woodson v. State
325 Md. 251; 600
A.2d 420; 1992
remanded for new trial 19920124
Police officers responded to reports that someone was doing drugs in the stairwell
of an apartment building. They arrived and the defendant tried to flee, but then shot
one officer in the head, killing him, and shot another officer, who was not killed
because the bullets hit his bulletproof vest instead.
Whittlesey v. State




Defendant brutally murdered an acquaintance in the woods, concealed the body,
and then took his money and car. Body was not found until several years later.
Def. was found guilty of robbery before the body was discovered, and then murder
after the body was discovered. The initial robbery conviction served as the
aggravator in murder trial.
Booth v. State
327 Md. 142; 608
A.2d 162; 1992
death 19920624
Defendants robbed and stabbed an elderly couple to death in their home. The
defendants were trying to get money to buy heroin. Defendant Booth was the
principal for one of the murders.
Bruce v. State
328 Md. 594; 616
A.2d 392; 1992
affirmed; later resentenced to
LIP 19921210
Defendants knew the victims were in the drug business and believed there was a
suitcase full of money in the victim's apartment. The defendants went to the
apartment of one of the victims with the intent to rob and kill several of the
occupants. Defendants entered the apartment and shot and killed five of the six
occupants. The sixth occupant was shot in the head twice, but was still alive. She
pretended to be dead until the defendants were gone, then she went to a neighbor's
apartment for help.
Thanos v. State
330 Md. 77; 622
A.2d 727; 1993
death 19930405
The 18 year-old male victim picked up the defendant who was hitchhiking. Once
in the victim's car, the defendant took a sawed-off rifle out of his duffle bag and
forced the victim to drive to a remote location. They got out of the car and the
defendant shot the victim in the head three times as he begged for his life. The
defendant then fled the scene in the victim's car.
Thanos v. State
330 Md. 576; 625
A.2d 932; 1993
affirmed and executed 19930607 Defendant robbed gas station, killing two gas station employees, ages 14 and 15.Victims were shot in the head with a sawed-off shotgun.
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Colvin v. State
332 Md. 144; 630
A.2d 725; 1993
affirmed - then commuted to
LIP in 2000 19930916
Defendant broke into the home with the intent to rob it. Upon encountering the
homeowner's 82 year-old mother who was visiting from Florida, the defendant
stabbed her twenty-eight times. The victim died as a result of the stab wounds.
Before leaving the home, the defendant stole jewelry and other personal items.
Grandison v. State
341 Md. 175; 670
A.2d 398; 1995
Death 19951227
Defendant Grandison was facing drug charges in an upcoming trial, and wanted
two of the witnesses against him killed. Defendant Grandison promised to pay
Defendant Evans the sum of $9,000 for murdering the two witnesses. Defendant
Evans went to the victims' place of employment and shot and killed two people
with a MAC-11 machine pistol. However, Defendant Evans shot one of the
intended targets, but made a mistake and killed the sister of the second intended
victim instead of the person he was actually being paid to kill.
Williams v. State
342 Md. 724; 679
A.2d 1106; 1996
remanded for new trial 19960730
Defendant broke into the home of the two victims and shot them both in the back of
the head, killing them. The defendant stole their ATM cards, their car, and other
personal items.
Perry v. State
344 Md. 204; 686
A.2d 274; 1996
affirmed - conviction
overturned due to counsel’s
ineffective assistance in failing
to make timely objection to
patently inadmissible evidence
that provided the crucial link
between Perry and the offense;
retrial affirmed sentence in
2002
19961216
Defendant Perry was hired by Defendant Horn to kill Horn's ex-wife, Horn's
disabled son, and the disabled son's nurse so that Horn could collect over $1 million
from a trust for his disabled son. Defendant Perry went to the residence of the ex-
wife where he shot her and the nurse in the head, killing them. Defendant Perry
suffocated Horn's disabled son, killing him as well.
Conyers v. State
345 Md. 525; 693
A.2d 781; 1997
remanded - death sentence
vacated and the conviction of
burglary reversed.
19970508
Defendants were broke into a house and were attempting to open a safe in the
master bedroom when they were interrupted by a woman knocking on the
backdoor. The defendant (Conyers) panicked and shot the woman in the head, and
then shot his accomplice so as to eliminate the only witness to initial murder of the
woman at the door.
Burch v. State
346 Md. 253; 696
A.2d 443; 1997
affirmed 19970703
Defendant broke into the home of an elderly couple, for the purpose of stealing
property that he could eventually sell in order to buy cocaine. When confronted by
the couple, he savagely attacked them and then stole some guns, some money, and




347 Md. 156; 699
A.2d 1170; 1997
affirmed - then later
overturned on direct appeal 19970910
Defendant planned to burglarize the residence of a former co-worker. He waited all
night outside the house, watching for the residents to leave in the morning. When
he thought the house was empty, he entered through a basement window. The 19
year-old daughter of the homeowners interrupted the burglary in progress. The
defendant shot the woman six times and fled the scene in the victim's car with some
of the victim's belongings.
Lovell v. State
347 Md. 623; 702
A.2d 261; 1997
remanded for new sentencing 19971112
Defendants were transporting a large portion of drugs from NYC to NC when they
were stopped by a Maryland State Trooper for speeding. When the Trooper noticed
that something was suspicious in the vehicle, he called for backup. When the
Trooper returned to the driver's side window of the defendant's vehicle, Defendant
Lovell shot the trooper in the head and fled the scene. The trooper died instantly
from the gunshot wound.
Ware v. State
348 Md. 19; 702
A.2d 699; 1997
remanded for new trial 19971118
Defendant and the first female victim were engaged. During a domestic dispute
between the couple, the defendant went to his fiancée’s home with a gun. As the
dispute continued, the defendant shot and killed his fiancée and a friend who was
also at the scene.
Clermont v. State
348 Md. 419; 704
A.2d 880; 1998
affirmed; later overturned and
resentenced to LIP 19980120
Defendants followed victim as he drove home, planning to rob him and steal his car
when he parked. When the victim arrived at his home and exited the vehicle, the
defendants did rob him, but were unhappy with the small amount of money the
victim had in his wallet. They forced the victim into the trunk of his car and drove
to a remote location where they tried to force the victim to tell them the pin number
for his ATM card. The defendant (Clermont) was frustrated and shot a single bullet
through the top of the trunk, which killed the victim.
Conyers v. State
354 Md. 132; 729
A.2d 910; 1999
affirmed 19990517
Defendants were broke into a house and were attempting to open a safe in the
master bedroom when they were interrupted by a woman knocking on the
backdoor. The defendant (Conyers) panicked and shot the woman in the head, and
then shot his accomplice so as to eliminate the only witness to initial murder of the
woman at the door.
Methany v. State






Defendant had sex with the female victim/sexually assaulted her in his trailer before
strangling her to death and robbing her of anything of value. He buried the victim
in a shallow grave.
Ware v. State
360 Md. 650; 759
A.2d 764; 2000
affirmed - then resentenced to
LWOP. 20000914
Defendant and the first female victim were engaged. During a domestic dispute
between the couple, the defendant went to his fiancé’s home with a gun. As the
dispute continued, the defendant shot and killed his fiancé and a friend who was
also at the scene.
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Winder v. State
362 Md. 275; 765
A.2d 97; 2001
remanded to Wicomico
County for new trial 20010109
Defendant broke into the house of the three victims, killed them in their own home,
and then set fire to the house before leaving.
Miles v. State
365 Md. 488; 781
A.2d 787; 2001
affirmed 20010918 Defendant robbed the male victim and then shot him to death.
Borchardt v. State
367 Md. 91; 786
A.2d 631; 2001
death 20011213
Defendant robbed two victims in their home and then stabbed and killed them
before fleeing with money and other personal belongings from their house.
Defendant advised he did this to support his drug habit.
Baker v. State
367 Md. 648; 790
A.2d 629; 2002
affirmed and executed 20020202 Defendants shot and killed one female victim in a mall parking lot while attemptingto rob her. This crime was witnessed by two members of the victim’s family.
Miller v. State




Defendant lured the 17 year-old female victim into his apartment and then strangled
her with his belt and robbed her. She died as a result of the strangulation. He also
attempted to rape her and then sexually assaulted her.
Oken v. State
381 Md. 580; 851
A.2d 538; 2004
affirmed and executed 20040609
Defendant broke into the home of his first victim where he sexually assaulted and
shot and killed her. He fled and then raped and killed his sister in law before
fleeing to Maine and raping and killing another woman. Defendant was caught and
prosecuted on charges in Maine before being returned to Maryland to face charges.
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Appendix B: Results of the Propensity Score Method Using 10 
Comparison Cases and 30 Comparison Cases 
 
Table 8: Proportion of Affirmed Death Sentences for Defendants  
Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases Where  
Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score 
 
Case Propensity Score using 10 
comparison cases 
Propensity Score using 30 
comparison cases 
Perry v. State  4/10 (.40) 10/30 (.33)* 
Hunt v. State  1/10 (.10)* 3/30 (.10)* 
Jones v. State  1/10 (.10)* 4/30 (.13)* 
Calhoun v. State  2/10 (.20)* 7/30  (.23)* 
Colvin v. State  1/10 (.10)* 5/30  (.17)* 
Harris v. State  2/10 (.20)* 2/30  (.06)* 
Tichnell v. State (III)  5/8 (.63) 7/15  (.47) 
Baker v. State  1/10 (.10)* 1/30  (.03)* 
Booth v. State (II b)  3/10 (.30)* 3/30  (.10)* 
Collins v. State  1/10 (.10)* 1/30  (.03)* 
Foster v. State  1/10 (.10)* 0/30  (0)* 
Booth v. State (II a)  4/10 (.40) 1/30  (.03)* 
Booth v. State (II c)  4/10 (.40) 2/30  (.06)* 
Bowers v. State  4/10 (.40) 4/30  (.13)* 
Miles v. State  1/10 (.10)* 2/30  (.06)* 
Ware v. State  1/10 (.10)* 1/30  (.03)* 
Henry v. State  4/10 (.40) 4/30  (.13)* 
Stebbing v. State  0/10 (.00)* 0/30  (0)* 
Conyers v. State  3/10 (.30)* 4/30  (.13)* 
Johnson (L.) v. State  3/10 (.30)* 12/25  (.48) 
Gilliam v. State  0/10 (.00)* 4/30  (.13)* 
Huffington v. State  2/10 (.20)* 4/30  (.13)* 
White v. State  3/10 (.30)* 4/30  (.13)* 
Mills v. State  3/10 (.30)* 6/30  (.20)* 
Trimble v. State  4/10 (.40)* 14/30  (.47) 
Evans v. State  1/10 (.10)* 6/30  (.20)* 
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Thanos v. State  1/10 (.10)* 10/21 (.48) 
Ball v. State  0/10 (.00)* 1/30  (.03)* 
Evans v. State  2/10 (.20)* 5/30  (.17)* 
Grandison v. State  2/10 (.20)* 5/30  (.17)* 
Grandison v. State  2/10 (.20)* 4/30  (.13)* 
Bruce v. State  5/10 (.50) 12/23  (.52) 
Colvin v. State  1/10 (.10)* 5/30 (.17)* 
Clermont v. State  1/10 (.10)* 4/30 (.13)* 
Burch v. State  1/10 (.10)* 6/30  (.20)* 
Oken v. State  4/10 (.40) 6/30  (.20)* 
Thanos v. State  5/10 (.50) 10/21  (.48) 
Wiggins v. State  3/10 (.30)* 6/30  (.20)* 
Borchardt v. State  1/10 (.10)* 6/30  (.20)* 
*denotes cases in which less than 35% of similar cases received a death sentence 
Table 8: Part B 
Summary: Proportion of Affirmed Death Sentences for Defendants  
Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases Where  
Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score: 
Comparison Group of 30 Comparable Cases 
 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in This Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death Cases 
Less than .35 33/39 84.5% 
.35 - .50 5/39 12.5% 
.51 - .75 1/39 3% 
.76 – 1.00 0/39 0% 
Table 8: Part C 
Summary: Proportion of Affirmed Death Sentences for Defendants  
Within Subgroups of Comparable Cases Where  
Comparable Cases are Defined in Terms of Overall Propensity Score:  
Comparison Group of 10 Comparable Cases 
 
Probability of Death Sentence 
for Comparable Cases 
Number of Affirmed Death 
Cases in This Category 
Percent of Affirmed Death Cases 
Less than .35 29/39 74% 
.35 - .50 9/39 23% 
.51 - .75 1/39 3% 
.76 – 1.00 /39 0% 
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